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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE RIGHT TO HONEST
GOVERNMENT: PROSECUTING PUBLIC
CORRUPTION AFTER McNALLY v.
UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 1987, the United States Supreme Court turned the Justice
Department upside down by severely limiting the Department's most
powerful tool for combating white-collar crime.1 In McNally v. United
States,2 the Court announced that the mail fraud statute,3 known as the
"true love" of the United States Attorney's Office,4 could no longer be
used to prosecute fraud that deprived an individual of an "intangible
right," such as the right to honest government.6 Instead, the Court held
that the mail fraud statute was limited in scope to protection of property
rights.7 This holding was surprising because intangible rights had been
protected under the statute by the federal circuit courts since the 1940s.1
The holding was also unexpected considering that it came from a Court
known to be hard on criminal defendants.
9
Five months after McNally, the newly-limited scope of the mail
fraud statute was altered by the Court's decision in Carpenter v. United
States.10 The Carpenter Court concluded that while mail fraud must in-
1. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
2. Id.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
4. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REv. 771 (1980).
5. "Intangible rights" are non-monetary rights and include the right to honest services of
government officials, United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461
U.S. 913 (1983); the right of an employer to the honest services of employees, United States v.
Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980); the right of privacy as to
confidential information, United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert denied,
439 U.S. 896 (1978); and the right to have elections conducted free of fraud, United States v.
States; 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
6. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd in relevant part, 602
F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), petition for writ of error coram
nobis granted, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987) (intangible right to honest and faithful govern-
ment); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941)
(intangible right to have public officials free from bribery); United States v. Buckner, 108 F.2d
921 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 309 U.S. 669 (1940) (intangible right to have fiduciaries refrain from
using inside position to obtain secret profits).
9. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2891 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
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deed involve a loss of money or property, "property" can include such
intangibles as confidential information or the "property" right to a news-
paper's publication schedule." Thus, in Carpenter, the Court expanded
the definition of "property" to include certain kinds of intangible
rights. 2 The expanded definition in Carpenter took some of the "sting"
out of the McNally decision by recognizing a wider range of conduct that
may fall within the purview of the mail fraud statute. 3 However, the
McNally holding-that a deprivation of intangible rights alone was not
sufficient to sustain a mail fraud conviction-remained unchanged by
Carpenter. 14
This Note initially outlines the history of the mail fraud statute and
the development of the intangible rights doctrine. The Note then sets
forth a statement of McNally v. United States and analyzes the Court's
reasoning. Additionally, this Note explores the effect that the decision
will have on the future of prosecution of public corruption, and discusses
the flurry of reversals of convictions that have already resulted in the
wake of McNally." Finally, various proposals for legislative change to
reverse the effects of the McNally decision are examined.
II. HISTORY OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE AND THE INTANGIBLE
RIGHTS DOCTRINE
A. Legislative History of the Mail Fraud Statute
The original mail fraud statute was enacted in 1872,1 following rec-
ommendations made by a congressionally appointed commission estab-
lished to revise the postal laws. 7 At the time it was enacted, the statute
generated virtually no congressional debate and, as a result, contained
little indication of legislative intent. 8 Representative Farnsworth, the
House sponsor of the legislation, explained that the statute was necessary
11. rI at 320.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 320-21 (citing McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2879, 2881 (1987)).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 828 F.2d 21 (7th Cir.),
vacated, 108 S. Ct. 53 (1987), on remand, 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2022 (1988); Ingber v. Enzor, No. 86-1402 (S.D.N.Y. February 4, 1987), petition for writ of
habeas corpus granted, 664 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d
1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980), petition for writ of error coram nobis granted, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987).
16. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323.
17. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74.
18. See generally Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-Corruption Pros-
ecutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 562, 567-72 (1980) (discus-
sion of early legislative history).
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"to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities...
by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiv-
ing and fleecing the innocent people in the country."19
While this expansive purpose may not seem overly illuminating at
first, examining the language of the statute and the historical context in
which it was drafted is helpful. The original statute indicated that to
violate the statute, three elements must be met: (1) a person devised a
scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) the person intended to effectuate this
scheme by opening some correspondence through the post office; and
(3) the person actually carried out the scheme by depositing or receiving
a letter or packet through the mails.2" Thus, the statute's purpose was to
prevent fraudulent schemes that used the post office as the scheme's
instrumentality.
Historically, the mail fraud statute was part of extensive federal leg-
islation enacted during the Reconstructionist Period.21 One commenta-
tor has noted that during this post-Civil War period, two impulses
prompted Congress to create numerous criminal and civil statutes.
22
One concern was the increase in large scale, national crime.2 3 Since state
and local criminal codes were not equipped to deal with interstate behav-
ior, federal intervention was deemed necessary.2'
The second impetus behind broad federal legislation during the Re-
construction Period was a perception of enhanced federal power follow-
ing the Civil War.25 This perception, coupled with the public's cry for
relief from rampant post war bribery and fraud, caused Congress to pass
new laws in broad, sweeping language, which clearly demonstrated mas-
19. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth). In 1870,
Representative Farnsworth introduced the bill based on the Postal Commission's recommen-
dations to the 41st Congress. The bill failed to pass, and was reintroduced in 1872 at the 42nd
Congress. It passed at that time, with the substance of the Commission's recommendations
still intact. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323.
20. Id. The statute as originally enacted provided in pertinent part:
That if any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, [to] be effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence or
communication with any other person... shall, in and for executing such scheme or
artifice... place any letter or packet in any post-office of the United States... shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor....
Id.
21. See generally Rakoff, supra note 4, at 779-86 (discussion of early history of mail fraud
statute in context of Reconstructionist era).
22. Id. at 780.
23. Id. (citing W. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 224-37
(1962); H. FAULKNER, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 483-86, 516-17 (1960); J. FRANKLIN,
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sive federal power.26 An example of this kind of statute is one enacted in
1867, making it a crime to "defraud the United States in any manner
whatever."'27 The mail fraud statute, enacted just five years later, con-
tained the same kind of broad prohibition against fraudulent activity
through use of the post office.
In spite of the seemingly clear language of the mail fraud statute,
early judicial interpretation was inconsistent.28 The statute required an
intent to effectuate the scheme through the use of the mails; thus, some
courts reasoned that the only schemes that the statute proscribed were
those in which the mails were absolutely essential.29 A court could easily
find that the mailing was not essential to the fraud by simply noting that
it was not the kind of fraud that necessarily depended on the mails for
the fraud to be effectuated. Thus, many fraudulent swindlers slipped
past the reach of the statute.30
Congress amended the mail fraud statute in 1889 in an attempt to
deal with this judicial confusion.31 The revised statute prohibited specific
schemes, such as "spurious coin, bank notes, paper money.., the 'saw-
dust swindle' ... [and] 'green cigars.' ,32 Unfortunately, this amend-
26. Id. Rakoff noted that much of Congress' more specific legislation encountered resist-
ance immediately following the Civil War from "recalcitrant southerners" and "economically
depressed and dislocated northerners." Id. at n.46. For example, attempts to collect the fed-
eral excise tax on whiskey were met with bribery of distillery inspectors and fraudulent docu-
ments submitted to revenue agents. Id. Thus, Congress enacted broad federal legislation to
demonstrate the coherent power of the federal government in putting an end to this kind of
fraudulent activity.
27. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484. This provision is now section 371 of
Title 18, and provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States... each shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
28. See United States v. Jones, 10 F. 469, 470 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (scheme to sell coun-
terfeit money held actionable under the statute, since use of the mails involved). But see
United States v. Owens, 17 F. 72, 74 (E.D. Mo. 1883) (fraudulent creditor not covered under
statute even though scheme used mails to claim bill payment had been lost, since credit avoid-
ance is not dependent upon mails).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 36 F. 492, 493 (V.D. Pa. 1888) (court held that
more than mere sending of letter forming part of fraud is needed to constitute offense; there-
fore, scheme to deceive accident insurance company as to date of remittance is not within
statute); Owens, 17 F. at 74 (statute was designed to strike at "common schemes" whereby
fraudulent circulars are distributed through mails; consequently, credit avoidance is not kind
of "common scheme" intended to be covered under statute). But see United States v. Watson,
35 F. 358, 359 (E.D. N.C. 1888) (plan to cheat by ordering goods through mail with intention
of not paying constitutes scheme to defraud).
30. See, e.g., Owens, 17 F. at 74; Mitchell, 36 F. at 493.
31. Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873.
32. Id.
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ment did not succeed in providing any uniformity to the decisions that
followed. Courts remained divided over how essential the use of the
mails needed to be in these schemes to constitute a violation of the
statute.33
Two impetuses occurred to cause the mail fraud statute to be
amended in 1909. One was the judicial uncertainty over the extent to
which the mailings had to be essential to the scheme to defraud. In re-
sponse to this concern, the 1909 amendment removed much of the "mail
emphasizing" language from the statute.34 Under the amended statute,
the elements of mail fraud were: (1) a person must have devised a
scheme or artifice to defraud; and (2) must have effectuated the scheme
by placing a letter with the post office.35 Intent to effectuate the scheme
by use of the mails was no longer an element of the crime. This change
clarified the notion that even crimes that did not absolutely require use of
the mails would still be covered under the statute.36 Thus, the amend-
ment seemed to broaden the statute's reach.
The second impetus for the 1909 amendment was a desire to codify
the Supreme Court's holding in Durland v. United States .3  Durland was
decided in 1896, and was the first case in which the Supreme Court inter-
preted the scope of the mail fraud statute.38 Durland involved a bond
investment scheme, whereby parties were promised that, in exchange for
payment, they would be issued bonds with increased redemption value.39
In fact, the defendants never intended to follow through on their
promises. The defendant argued that since the scheme involved only
false promises with respect to future payments, he could not be guilty of
33. See, eg., Etheredge v. United States, 186 F. 434, 442 (5th Cir. 1911) (ordering goods
with no intention to pay cannot amount to mail fraud scheme to defraud, as not mail depen-
dant); United States v. Clark, 121 F. 190, 191 (M.D. Pa. 1903) (correspondence-school swindle
not covered under statute since distribution of circulars not mail dependent); United States v.
Smith, 45 F. 561, 562-63 (E.D. Wis. 1891) (fraudulent inducements to medical treatment not
covered under statute as not mail dependent). But see Milby v. United States, 109 F. 638, 642-
43 (6th Cir. 1901) (scheme to sell counterfeit money covered under statute, as it constitutes
scheme to defraud); Culp v. United States, 82 F. 990, 990-91 (3rd Cir. 1897) (ordering goods
with no intention to pay is scheme to defraud within statute).
34. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130. See infra note 43 for text of
amended statute.
35. United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155 (1914) (defining elements of recodified statute in
scheme involving fraudulent investments).
36. Id. at 161. The lower court had dismissed the case, finding that the mails were not
essential to the scheme. Id. at 158-59. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 162.
37. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
38. Id. at 313-15.
39. Id. at 312.
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fraud.' The Court held that the statute "includes everything designed to
defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and
promises as to the future."41 The defendant's promises with respect to
future payments were, therefore, included within the statute's scope.
The 1909 amendment was a codification of the holding in Durland,
and the most crucial change in the new language of the statute reflected
the statute's expanded reach. 2 The 1909 statute thus proscribed "[a]ny
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises.'
4 3
As with the original statute, Congress did not provide any legislative his-
tory of this change. Senator Heyburn, sponsor of the amendment, stated
that the change was obvious, and needed no further explanation.'
Indeed, if further explanation of the statute's scope was needed, the
Court answered any questions in Badders v. United States,4 decided in
1916. Badders involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the mail
fraud statute under the argument that Congress had no power to legislate
against "a fraudulent scheme that is itself outside the jurisdiction of Con-
gress to deal with."46 In upholding the constitutionality of the statute,
Justice Holmes writing for a unanimous Court, stated that Congress may
regulate the use of the mails.47 Accordingly, Holmes concluded that
when the mails are involved, Congress had the power to "forbid any such
acts done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public
policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not."4
The decision in Badders clarified a number of aspects about the stat-
ute. The amended statute contained two important changes-it elimi-
nated the mailing-intent requirement and included the crime of false
40. Id. at 312-13. At common law, one could be convicted of the crime of false pretenses
only if misrepresentations of existing or past facts were made. Id. at 313. The crime of false
pretenses did not include false promises-intentions not to carry out acts in the future. Id.
41. Id.
42. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130.
43. Id. The amended statute read, in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, represen-
tations, or promises... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or at-
tempting to do so, place... any... writing.., in any post-offie ... shall be fined
not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Act of June 9, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130-31. This is essentially the same language as
in the current version of the mail fraud statute at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
44. 42 CONG. REc. 1026 (1908) (remarks of Sen. Heyburn).
45. 240 U.S. 391 (1916). See infra notes 388-414 and accompanying text for analysis of
Badders as applied to McNally.





promises. Badders held that these changes were unquestionably constitu-
tional.4 9 Moreover, the Court concluded that the "scheme to defraud"
requirement was to be read broadly, Le., to include schemes that may not
have fallen within Congress' power to regulate "but for" the use of the
mails.5 0 Holmes' expansive reading of the phrase "scheme to defraud"
proved to be the most crucial language in the Badders decision, as future
courts struggled to determine exactly what kinds of schemes were pro-
scribed."1 In particular, the statement that Congress could proscribe
"any scheme contrary to public policy" led courts to develop what has
become known as the intangible rights doctrine.5 2
B. Development of the Intangible Rights Doctrine
In the original mail fraud statute and the 1909 amendment, Con-
gress chose not to define "scheme to defraud." Perhaps Congress be-
lieved that no definition was necessary because, as Justice Holmes' said,
"the law does not define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as old as false-
hood and as versable as human ingenuity."5 3 Courts however, have had
to set guidelines as to what constitutes "defraud" within the meaning of
the mail fraud statute.54 Many courts have formulated the definition of
defraud by using the Badders v. United States5 view that any scheme
contrary to public policy which involves deception can be prosecuted
under the mail fraud statute if the mails are used in the execution of the
scheme.5 6 For example, in Gregory v. United States, 7 the Fifth Circuit
held that measuring a "scheme to defraud" involves determining "moral
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 495-96 (4th Cir. 1975) (scheme to enable
Florida residents to obtain cigarettes without declaring sales and use tax); United States v.
States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974) (election fraud
scheme); see also United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (scheme to seduce
woman through bogus talent agency); United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978) (scheme to obtain confidential information).
52. See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd in relevant part, 602 F.2d
653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), petition for writ of error coram nobis
granted, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974). See also Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir.
1967); Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1958).
53. Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941).
54. See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd in relevant part, 602 F.2d
653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), petition for writ of error coram nobis
granted, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987); United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir.
1976).
55. 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
56. Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958) (to measure a scheme to
defraud, determine moral uprightness and fundamental honesty); see also Mandel, 591 F.2d at
November 1988]
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uprightness... fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the
general and business life of members of society." 8 This kind of defini-
tion of "defraud" in the context of the mail fraud statute was instrumen-
tal in the development of the intangible rights doctrine.
The intangible rights doctrine grew out of the notion that morally
reprehensible behavior or conduct against public policy could be prose-
cuted under the mail fraud statute. 9 Application of the statute was not
restricted to cases in which the victim had suffered monetary or property
loss."0 Rather, a "scheme to defraud" was found if the defendant had
defrauded someone of a "lawful right,"'" or had used the mails for a
scheme involving deception that failed to measure up to accepted moral
standards and notions of honesty and fair play.62
Among the earliest cases to interpret the far-reaching Badders hold-
ing, and frequently cited for the intangible rights doctrine,6 3 are United
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co."4 and Shushan v. United States.65 In
Proctor & Gamble, an employee was found to have defrauded his em-
ployer of "loyal and honest" services by selling confidential informa-
1360 (citing Badders rationale); Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967)
("law puts its imprimatur on accepted moral standards").
57. 253 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1958).
58. Id. at 109.
59. See, ag., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 913 (1983) (political party committee chairman involved in kickback scheme);
Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1363 (governor of Maryland concealed material information in signing
legislation); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
976 (1976), petition for writ of error coram nobis denied, 678 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. 111. 1987),
aff'd, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988) (city alderman used political position to purchase proper-
ties, remove encumbrances, and aid in sale of properties at inflated prices); United States v.
States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974) (election fraud
scheme); Gregory, 253 F.2d at 109 (football contest fraud).
60. See, eg., United States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 1987) (no money or
property loss needed for mail fraud finding); United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 410 (5th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1149-50 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974).
61. See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass. 1942).
62. Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1361; States, 488 F.2d at 764; Blachly, 380 F.2d at 671.
63. Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1362 (citing Shushan rationale); United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d
414, 421 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976) (citing Proctor & Gamble rationale);
United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976)
(citing Proctor & Gamble rationale); Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1150 (citing Shushan rationale). But
see Intangible-Rights, supra note 18, at 584-87. The author stated that Proctor & Gamble and
Shushan do not support the intangible rights doctrine, and cases that have relied on them have
done so erroneously. The author reasoned that in both cases victims had been deprived of
money or property, and any statements by the courts that could be construed as supporting the
intangible rights doctrine were dicta.
64. 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942).
65. 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
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tion.66 The court found that the employee's breach of duty had
"defraud[ed] the employer of a lawful right"-the employer's right that
the employee be honest and loyal to the employer's interests and not
wrongfully divulge confidential information.67 This breach of duty, cou-
pled with the employee's deception in concealing the sale, constituted a
"scheme to defraud."6
Shushan involved the bribery of a public official,69 and is therefore
often cited in public corruption cases.7" The scheme in that case centered
on obtaining inflated fees for bond issues. To effectuate the scheme, the
bribed official had to persuade the city's Parish Levee Board to go along
with the plan, concealing both the fact that the bonds were being issued
at inflated prices and that the official would ultimately receive the excess
monies.7 In holding that such conduct constituted mail fraud, the court
reasoned that "[n]o trustee has more sacred duties than a public official,
and any scheme to obtain an advantage by corrupting ... one must in
the federal law be considered a scheme to defraud."72 Thus, the court
held that when a public contract is obtained on more favorable terms by
bribing a public official, a "scheme to defraud the public" has occurred.73
Shushan and Procter & Gamble are both premised on the theory that
66. Proctor & Gamble, 47 F. Supp. at 678.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court stated that:
When one tampers with [the employer-employee relationship] for the purpose of
causing the employee to breach his duty he in effect is defrauding the employer of a
lawful right. The actual deception that is practised is in the continued representation
of the employee to the employer that he is honest and loyal to the employer's
interests.
Id. Later courts were careful to note that a scheme to defraud could not be proven by breach
of fiduciary duty alone. In United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982), the court held that:
Although a mere breach of fiduciary duty, standing alone, may not necessarily con-
stitute a mail fraud .... the concealment by a fiduciary of material information which
he is under a duty to disclose to another under circumstances where the non-disclo-
sure could or does result in harm to the other is a violation of the statute.
Id. at 926 (citations omitted). Thus, Bronston held that breach of fiduciary duty, plus the
deception that stems from the concealment of material information, constitutes mail fraud. A
mail fraud violation requires the additional element of deceit, since a scheme to defraud must
be devised with specific intent. Id. at 927. See also United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999,
1005 n.14 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981) (additional element which trans-
forms mere fiduciary breach into criminal offense is failure to disclose material information).
69. Shushan, 117 F.2d at 110.
70. See, eg., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1153 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1085 (1984) (election fraud); United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974) cert
denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975) (bribery scheme involving county clerk); Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1150.
71. Shushan, 117 F.2d at 114-15.
72. Id. at 115.
73. Id.
,333
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certain relationships create a fiduciary duty on the part of an employee.74
Accordingly, when the fiduciary fails to disclose material information
that he is under a duty to disclose by virtue of the fiduciary relationship,
and the failure to disclose could or does result in harm, the employee has
devised a "scheme to defraud."75 The theory is the same in both the
public and private sector. In explaining the duty of a public official, the
First Circuit stated, "the affirmative duty to disclose material informa-
tion arises out of a government official's fiduciary relationship to his or
her employer, whether as a public or as a private employee." 76 Thus, a
fiduciary's failure to disclose this information violates the mail fraud
statute.
Following Shushan, numerous circuit courts adopted the view that
schemes involving bribery, falsification and non-disclosure of material in-
formation, particularly by public officials, constituted mail fraud.77 In
United States v. States,78 for example, two politicians running for election
were found guilty of mail fraud by submitting false and fraudulent voter
registration affidavits bearing the names of fictitious persons for the pur-
pose of influencing the outcome of the upcoming elections. 79 The court
noted that the purpose of the mail fraud statute was to "prohibit the
misuse of the mails to further fraudulent enterprises."" ° The court held
that falsification of election results was a fraudulent enterprise, and
therefore fell within the purview of the mail fraud statute, even though
there had been-no loss of money or property.81
In United States v. Mandel,82 the Governor of Maryland was con-
victed of mail fraud when the court found that he had concealed his
74. Id.; Proctor & Gamble, 47 F. Supp. at 678.
75. See, eg., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 19 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983) (misappropriation of confidential securities information); United States v.
Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (failure to disclose unrecorded cash sales); United States
v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512-13 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973) (purchasing agent
received kickbacks from supplier).
76. United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1987) (concealment of kickback
scheme by City Budget Director).
77. See, eg., Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1153; Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1359-60; United States v.
Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374-75 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 546 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976), petition for writ of error coram nobis denied, 678
F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff'd, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988); Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1150.
78. 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
79. Id. at 763.
80. Id. at 764.
81. Id. at 766.
82. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.




personal stake in legislation that he supported. 3 The Mandel court
stated that Mandel's "failure to disclose the existence of a direct interest
in a matter that he [was] passing on defraud[ed] the public.., of their
intangible right to honest, loyal, faithful and disinterested govern-
ment."' 4 The Mandel court further noted that "[a]t this late date, there
can be no real contention that many schemes to defraud a state and its
citizens of intangible rights, e.g., honest and faithful government, may
not fall within the purview of the mail fraud statute.
'8 5
The McNally v. United States 6 case reached the Supreme Court
against this background of years of precedent at the circuit level uphold-
ing the intangible rights doctrine. Prior to McNally, the Court had never
considered the issue of intangible rights. In fact, the Court had consist-
ently refused to grant certiorari to every intangible rights case that was
presented to it. 7 When the Court finally decided to consider the doc-
trine in McNally, its holding marked a radical departure from the
Mandel court's confidence in the viability of intangible rights.
III. MCNALLY v. UNITED STATES: STATEMENT OF THE CASE
James Gray and Charles McNally were convicted by jury of mail
fraud under section 1341 of Title 18 of the United States Code,"8 for
conducting a "scheme ... to defraud," as provided by the mail fraud
statute.9 A third person, Howard "Sonny" Hunt was also indicted.
Hunt, however, pleaded guilty to mail fraud and was sentenced to three
years in prison.90
Hunt, Gray and McNally were politically active in the Democratic
Party of Kentucky during the 1970s. After Julian Carroll was elected
Governor of Kentucky in 1974, Hunt was appointed chairman of the
state Democratic Party.91 Gray served as Secretary of Public Protection
and Regulation from 1976 to 1978, and also as Secretary of the Gover-
nor's Cabinet from 1977 to 1979. McNally occupied no public office, but
83. Id. at 1364.
84. Id. at 1363.
85. Id. at 1362.
86. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
87. See, e.g., Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (certiorari denied); Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (certio-
rari denied); Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (certiorari denied). Prior to McNally, the Supreme Court
had not addressed the meaning of "scheme to defraud" in more than 60 years. See Fasulo v.
United States, 272 U.S. 620 (1926) ("scheme to defraud" does not encompass use of mails to
obtain money by means of threats of murder or bodily harm).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
89. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2879 (1987).
90. Id. at 2878.
91. Id. at 2877.
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was "a staunch political ally of Governor Carroll."92
One of Hunt's responsibilities was to select the insurance agencies
from which the state would purchase its policies. Hunt suggested to
Robert Tabeling, Vice-President of the Wombwell Insurance Company
(Wombwell), that, in exchange for purchasing the state's insurance with
Wombwell, Wombwell should agree to share or "kickback" any commis-
sions in excess of $50,000 a year with other insurance agencies specified
by Hunt. Wombwell agreed to this arrangement. 93
Between 1975 and 1979, Wombwell distributed $851,000 to 21 agen-
cies designated by Hunt.94 One of these agencies, Seton Investments,
Inc., (Seton) was a company controlled by Hunt and Gray, and nomi-
nally owned and operated by McNally.95 Seton was established in 1975
by Hunt and Gray for the sole purpose of receiving commissions from
Wombwell. Of the $851,000 distributed by Wombwell, approximately
$200,000 was paid to Seton. Hunt and Gray used the money to purchase
two condominiums and a car. Additionally, Seton provided Hunt's son
with checks totalling $38,500.96 In order to accomplish the distribution
of funds, Hunt had directed Wombwell to make payments to the
Snodgrass Insurance Agency, which in turn gave the money to Mc-
Nally.97 Thus, McNally personally received $77,500 "in return for act-
ing as Seton's frontman." s
Based on this series of events, federal authorities charged Hunt with
mail and tax fraud.99 Hunt pleaded guilty. Gray and McNally each
went to trial on one count of conspiracy and one count of mail fraud. 100
The mail fraud count alleged that Gray and McNally had devised a
scheme to defraud the citizens and government of Kentucky of their
right to have their affairs conducted honestly, impartially, and free from
bias. The count also alleged that Gray and McNally had devised a
scheme to obtain "money and other things of value by means of false
pretenses and the concealment of material facts." 10 1
The jury found Gray and McNally guilty of both mail fraud and
92. United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1293 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. McNally v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
93. Id. at 1292.
94. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2877.
95. Id. at 2877-78.
96. Gray, 790 F.2d at 1293.
97. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2878.
98. Gray, 790 F.2d at 1293.
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conspiracy. °10  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, 10 3 relying on
the line of cases holding that the mail fraud statute proscribes schemes to
defraud citizens of their right to honest and impartial government." 4
The United States Supreme Court reversed, and held that the mail fraud
statute was limited to the protection of property rights. 05 Since there
was no proof that the citizens of Kentucky had been deprived of money
or property, the Court concluded that the defendants' conduct did not
fall within the reach of the mail fraud statute.1
0 6
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
The majority's reasoning in McNally v. United States1°7 focused on
Congress' intent in passing the mail fraud statute.108 First, the Court
discussed the original statute's purpose as derived from legislative his-
tory.'09 The majority then examined the effect and purpose of the stat-
ute's amendment in 1909.110 Additionally, the Court explored the
common understanding of the word "defraud" to develop a firm defini-
tion of the phrase "scheme to defraud.""' Finally, following the concept
of lenity, the Court stated that since section 1341 is a criminal statute, it
should not be harshly read."' Accordingly, the Court held that the stat-
ute protected only property rights, based on the fact that Congress had
not expressly intended to include intangible rights within the statute's
scope. 1 3 Applying this reasoning to the facts of McNally, the Court con-
cluded that McNally and Gray could not be guilty of mail fraud." 4
102. Id. at 2879. McNally was convicted on the mail fraud count as an aider and abettor.
103. Gray, 790 F.2d at 1298.
104. Id. at 1294. The Gray court relied on: United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.),
aff'd in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), petition
for writ of error coram nobis granted, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987); United States v. Keane,
522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976), petition for writ of error corain
nobis denied, 678 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff'd, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988).
105. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879.
106. Id. at 2882.
107. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
108. Id. at 2879-81.
109. Id. at 2879-80. See infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 2880. See infra notes 122-39 and accompanying text.
111. Id. at 2880-81. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
112. Id. at 2881. See infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2881-82.
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A. The Majority's Analysis of Legislative History
In its analysis of the mail fraud statute, the majority in McNally
recognized that the legislative history of the statute is sparse, limited pri-
marily to the remarks of the bill's original 1872 sponsor, Representative
Farnsworth.11 The Court cited Farnsworth's comments on the statute's
purpose-that the statute was necessary "to prevent the frauds which are
mostly gotten up in the large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and rapscal-
lions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent
people in the country." '116 Additionally, the Court noted that one spe-
cific type of fraud mentioned by Farnsworth was a scheme whereby the
mail was used to solicit the purchase of counterfeit bills.1 17 The Court
therefore concluded that the legislative history "indicates that the origi-
nal impetus behind the mall fraud statute was to protect the people from
schemes to deprive them of their money or property."11
Further, the Court found that the language in the statute's 1889
amendment, in which specific schemes such as "green coin" and "green
cigars" were expressly prohibited,119 merely described many of the same
types of counterfeit currency schemes as those mentioned by Farnsworth
during the debates on the original bill.12 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that the addition of the 1889 amendment "appears to have been
nothing more than a reconfirmation of the statute's original purpose."121
B. The Majority's Analysis of the 1909 Amendment
The McNally Court continued its analysis by examining the 1909
amendment of the mail fraud statute. 22 Initially, the Court discussed
the reach of Durland v. United States,123 the case that led to the statute's
1909 amendment. 24 Durland, the Court noted, had held that the statute
"is to be interpreted broadly insofar as property rights are concerned, but
did not indicate that the statute had a more extensive reach."1 2 ' Specifi-
cally, the Durland Court had held that the term "any scheme or artifice
115. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2879 & n.5 (1987).
116. Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep.
Farnsworth)).
117. Id. at n.5.
118. Id at 2879.
119. Id. at 2880 n.6 (citing Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2879-80 (1987).
123. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
124. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879-80 (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896)).
125. Id. (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896)).
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to defraud" was not limited to misrepresentations of existing facts, but
also included suggestions or promises as to the future.'26 Accordingly, in
Durland, the use of the mails to sell bonds that the defendant did not
intend to honor had fallen within the statute. 127
The McNally Court then discussed the codification of this holding
by Congress in 1909.128 According to the Court, in codifying Durland,
Congress "gave further indication that the statute's purpose is protecting
property rights."' 29 The Court noted that the 1909 amendment merely
added the phrase "or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."' 30 Thus, the
Court concluded that Congress had extended the statute to include use of
the mails to convey false promises-an activity that would not have been
included within the common-law definition of "false pretenses."'
3'1
Therefore, the Sole crime added to the statute in 1909 was future misrep-
resentations. Consequently, the Court stated that the statute's original
purpose of protecting property rights remained unchanged by the
amendment.
32
The Court, however, recognized that after the codification of Dur-
land, the statute proscribed "schemes or artifices 'to defraud' or 'for ob-
taining money or property by means of false.., pretenses.' ,133 The two
phrases appear in the disjunctive, and "it is 'arguable that they are to be
construed independently."' 134 Thus, the Court noted, many circuit courts
have held that the money-or-property requirement of the second phrase
does not limit "any scheme to defraud" to those involving a deprivation
of money or property. 3  The Court stated that this erroneous reading of
the statute had enabled the circuit courts to develop the intangible rights
doctrine.
36
The Court indicated that the circuit courts that developed the intan-
gible rights doctrine were incorrect in reading the statute as they had.
126. Id. at 2880 (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896)).
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 312, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130).
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 312, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130).
131. Id. See supra text accompanying note 40.
132. Id. at 2881.
133. Id. at 2880.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1085 (1984); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 417
U.S. 909 (1974)).
136. Id. Although the Court did not explicitly state that the two phrases are not to be read
disjunctively, this seems to be the Court's implication.
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Instead, the Court's reading of the statute revealed that because the 1909
amendment added only false promises to the statute's scope, no addi-
tional requirement of money or property was to be imparted to the stat-
ute.1 37 According to the Court, the statute had always required a
deprivation of money or property. 138  The Court therefore concluded
that, although the statute appears to contain two independent phrases,
the money-or-property requirement, which appears only in the second
phrase, really modifies both phrases.1 39 The Court then interpreted the
word "defraud" to involve a deprivation of money or property as the
statutory meaning of the phrase "scheme to defraud."
C. The Majority's Interpretation of the Word "Defraud"
The McNally Court determined that the circuit courts that have
construed the statute to encompass intangible rights were mistaken for
two reasons. 140 First, the Durland v. United States141 codification only
added the inclusion of false promises; it did not change the meaning of
the phrase "any scheme to defraud." 42 Second, the words "to defraud"
commonly refer "to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest
methods or schemes."' 43 The Court stated that there was no indication
that Congress intended to depart from this "common understanding" of
the word "defraud."'" Thus, the Court reasoned that the circuits that
had interpreted "defraud" to include intangible rights had expanded the
statute beyond what Congress intended it to encompass: protection of
property rights.1
4
As support for the holding that the word "defraud" is limited to
property rights, the Court cited Hammerschmidt v. United States,146 a
case that interpreted the scope of the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. section
371 (the conspiracy statute).' 47 The conspiracy statute, enacted in
1867, 148 five years prior to the original mail fraud statute, made criminal
137. Id. at 2880-81.
138. Id. at 2881.
139. Id. at 2880.
140. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2880-81 (1987).
141. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
142. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2880-81. See supra notes 122-39 and accompanying text.
143. Id. (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)).
144. Id. at 2881.
145. Id. at 2880.
146. 265 U.S. 182 (1924).
147. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881 & n.8 (citing Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S.
182, 188 (1924)). See supra note 27 for the pertinent text of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
148. Act of March 2, 1867, § 30, 14 Stat. 471.
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any conspiracy "to defraud the United States."' 4 9 The Hammerschmidt
Court held that "to defraud" as used in section 371 means "to cheat the
Government out of property or money. '150
The McNally Court noted that other cases have interpreted section
371 as reaching conspiracies other than those directed at property inter-
ests.' Nonetheless, the McNally Court concluded that courts that ap-
plied a broad construction to section 371 "based [their holdings] on
consideration[s] not applicable to the mail fraud statute."' 2 The Court
stated that the distinction between the two statutes is that "[s]ection 371
is a statute aimed at protecting the Federal Government alone; however,
the mail fraud statute... had its origin in the desire to protect individual
property rights."' 53 Therefore, the Court concluded that the "common
understanding" of the term "defraud" as limited to property rights by
the Hammerschmidt Court also applies to the mail fraud statute.'54
D. The Majority's Reading of the Statute
The McNally Court recognized that the view it adopted-that the
mail fraud statute only protects property rights-was at odds with the
position taken by many circuit courts-that the statute also protects in-
tangible rights. 5 The Court, however, noted that "when there are two
rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are
to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and defi-
nite language."' 56 Additionally, the Court stated that before a person
can be punished for a criminal offense, "it must be shown that his case is
plainly within the statute."' 57 The Court then discussed the extension of
the mail fraud statute by the circuit courts. By encompassing protection
of intangible rights as within the scope of statute, the Court reasoned that
the circuit courts were construing the statute in a manner that left its
"outer boundaries ambiguous."'5 8 The Court did not elaborate on what
it was referring to by "ambiguous boundaries." Instead, the Court sug-
gested that intangible rights were never clearly defined as within the stat-
149. Id. at 2881 n.8 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 371).
150. Id. (quoting Hammerschxnidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)).
151. Id. (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462,
480 (1910)).
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Curley v. United States, 130 F. 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 195 U.S. 628
(1904)).
154. Id. at 2881.
155. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2880 (1987).
156. Id. at 2881 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)).
157. Id. (quoting Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 629 (1926)).
158. Id.
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ute's scope. 159 Presumably, the Court reasoned that prosecuting an
individual for violating intangible rights would involve a "harsher read-
ing" of the statute.
Further, the Court noted that the intangible rights doctrine "in-
volves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and
good government for local and state officials.""16 The Court stated that,
absent a clearer directive from Congress, the Court would not interpret
the statute to have this harsher reading."' Thus, the Court held that the
statute is limited in scope to the protection of property rights.162
E. The Majority's Application of the Holding to the McNally Facts
The Court applied the limited interpretation of the mail fraud stat-
ute to the facts of McNally and found that there was no evidence to sup-
port a conviction for mail fraud.1 63 The jury had not been charged nor
required to find that the state itself was defrauded of money or property
to convict the defendants. Nor had the jury been instructed that to con-
vict it had to find that, absent the scheme, the state would have paid
lower insurance premiums."' Additionally, there was no proof that the
money received by Hunt, Gray and McNally from Wombwell was the
state's money. The Court reasoned that insurance premiums would have
been paid to some agency, and Hunt, Gray and McNally had simply
shared part of the premiums that Wombwell received.16 Thus, since
there was no finding at trial that the state had actually lost money or
property, Gray and McNally's conduct did not constitute mail fraud. 166
At trial, Gray was found to have defrauded the people of Kentucky
of their right to honest government by his failure to disclose the arrange-
ment whereby Hunt, McNally and he shared insurance commissions
with the Wombwell agency.167 The Court assumed, however, that re-
quiring the Wombwell agency to share its commissions did not violate
state law.1 68 Further, the Court assumed that state law did not prohibit
Hunt and Gray from owning one of the agencies with which the
Wombwell agency shared its commissions. Finally, the Court noted that
159. Id. at 2879-81.
160. Id. at 2881.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881-82 (1987).
164. Id. at 2882.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2878-79.
168. Id. at 2882 n.9.
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state law did not require state officers such as Hunt and Gray to disclose
this type of arrangement.
169
The Court reasoned that since the entire scheme was not prohibited
under state law, it would be incongruous to require Gray to disclose such
a scheme, stating that:
[I]f state law expressly permitted or did not forbid a state officer
such as Gray to have an ownership interest in an insurance
agency handling the State's insurance, it would take a much
clearer indication than the mail fraud statute evidences to con-
vince us that having and concealing such an interest defrauds
the State and is forbidden under federal law.170
Thus, the Court refused to hold that the mail fraud statute imposed a
duty to disclose a scheme that was not contrary to state law.
Finally, the Court left open the possibility that Congress could con-
stitutionally criminalize using the mails to further a state officer's efforts
to profit from governmental decisions which he is empowered to make,
even if there is no state law which proscribes such profiteering.1 71 How-
ever, the Court held that under the current mail fraud statute, profiting
from governmental decisions is not prohibited. 72 Thus, the Court re-
versed the decision of the lower court upholding Gray and McNally's
conviction for mail fraud.
173
F. The Dissent
Justice Stevens wrote a biting four part dissent; Justice O'Connor
joined in parts I, II, and III.74 Initially, the dissent described the long
history of circuit decisions upholding the intangible rights doctrine in
cases involving public officials depriving citizens of honest government,
and cases involving private individuals for accepting kickbacks or selling
confidential information. 175 Justice Stevens stated that the circuits that
have considered the intangible rights doctrine shared a common conclu-
sion: "They have realized that nothing in the words 'scheme or artifice
to defraud' or in the purpose of the statute, justifie[d] limiting its applica-





172. Id. at 2882.
173. Id.
174. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2882 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2882-83 & nn.1-4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In Part I, the dissent examined the plain language of the statute, and
found that since the phrases "scheme or artifice to defraud" and "for
obtaining money or-property by means of false... pretenses" appear in
the disjunctive, the phrases should be construed independently. 177 Fur-
ther, Justice Stevens stated that the purpose of the statute was to protect
the integrity of the United States mails. 178  Accordingly, he concluded
that the conjunctive interpretation that the Court adopted "show[ed] no
fidelity to Congress' words or purpose." 179
Part II of the dissent focused on the majority's misinterpretation of
the common understanding of the word "defraud."18 0 Specifically, Jus-
tice Stevens discussed the use of the term "defraud" in the criminal con-
spiracy statute.81 In the context of that statute, "defraud" does not
necessarily encompass the loss of money or property. 18 2 Justice Stevens
also assailed the majority for suggesting that it was justified in interpret-
ing the mail fraud and conspiracy statutes differently because the latter
protects the United States while the former benefits private individu-
als.18 3 Additionally, he examined the definition of fraud at common law,
and found that the term was not limited to deprivations of money or
property.18 4 Finally, he noted that the mail fraud statute, as other legis-
lation enacted by Congress in the 19th century, was "written in broad
general language on the understanding that courts would have wide lati-
tude in construing them to achieve the remedial purposes that Congress
177. Id. at 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The focus of the statute is upon the misuse of the Postal
Service, not the regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate
such misuse of the mails." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. States, 488
F.2d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974)).
179. Id. at 2885 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also summarized some of the types
of fraud that had been prosecuted under the intangible rights doctrine, and stated that the
doctrine played "an indispensable role in effectuating Congress' goal of preserving the integrity
of the Postal Service." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. States, 488 F.2d
761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974) (election fraud); United States v.
Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975) (right to have business of office of Secretary of State
free from bribery)).
180. Id. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Stevens J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982)).
182. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182
(1924); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910)).
183. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) Justice Stevens stated:
[I]t is ludicrous to think that a Congress intent on preserving the integrity of the
Postal Service would have used the term 'defraud' in a narrow sense so as to allow
mailings whose purpose was merely to defraud citizens of rights other than money or
property.
Id. at 2887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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had identified." 185
The dissent continued by discussing the majority's misplaced use of
the rule of lenity. First, Justice Stevens noted that even if criminal stat-
utes are to be strictly construed, that does not mean a statute must be
"'given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the pur-
pose of the statute.' "186 Second, even if the statute was ambiguous as
written by Congress, whatever doubt existed was removed by the numer-
ous circuit decisions construing the statute."' Accordingly, the dissent
argued that the defendants had ample knowledge that their actions were
unlawful. 
18 8
The final portion of the dissent criticized the Court for rejecting the
"accumulated wisdom" of the judges who had found that the mail fraud
statute encompassed the intangible rights doctrine. Justice Stevens
stated:
This quality of this Court's work is most suspect when it stands
alone, or virtually so, against a tide of well-considered opinions
issued by state or federal courts. In this case I am convinced
that those judges correctly understood the intent of the Con-
gress that enacted this statute. Even if I were not so persuaded,
I could not join a rejection of such a long-standing, consistent
interpretation of a federal statue.1 9
Justice Stevens concluded his dissent by stating that the Court "ha[d]
made a serious mistake" by having acted "so dramatically to protect the
elite class of powerful individuals who [would] benefit from [the]
decision." 190
V. ANALYSIS
This analysis parallels the McNally Court's reasoning, discussing
185. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 658
(1982)).
187. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that not only did the Supreme Court
decisions construing the conspiracy statute make it clear that fraud was not limited to the
deprivation of tangible property, but also:
the series of Court of Appeals' opinions applying this very statute to schemes to
defraud a State and its citizens of their intangible right to honest and faithful govern-
ment, notwithstanding the absence of evidence of tangible loss, removed any relevant
ambiguity in this statute.
Id. at 2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2891 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor did not join in this final portion
of the dissent. Id. at 2882.
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each of the four areas outlined in Parts A through D above. 191 First, the
analysis examines the legislative history relied upon by the Court, and
determines whether there was in fact any basis for the Court's conclusion
that the statute protects only money or property. Second, the analysis
explores Durland v. United States192 and the subsequent amendment of
the mail fraud statute, and considers whether either indicate that the
statute's purpose was the protection of property rights. Third, the mean-
ing of the word "defraud" is examined as that word is used in two other
federal statutes and as the word is defined in dictionaries published dur-
ing the period in which the mail fraud statute was enacted. Finally, the
analysis considers why the Court may have decided that the statute
should be read narrowly.
A. Analysis of Legislative History
In McNally v. United States,193 the majority's reasoning rests on the
premise that Congress' purpose in enacting the mail fraud statute was "to
protect the people from schemes to deprive them of their money or prop-
erty."' 194 The Court derived this crucial proposition from Representative
Farnsworth's remarks at the time he introduced the original bill to Con-
gress. 19 5 As the Court conceded, Representative Farnsworth said very
little.1 96 The Court, however, concluded that Farnsworth only intended
money or property to be protected under the statute. This conclusion
was based on Farnsworth's example of a counterfeiting scheme as the
type of scheme that the statute should proscribe. 97
Representative Farnsworth's full comment on this point was:
I have here on my desk a large number of specimen circulars
and letters sent out, which have been forwarded to the Post
Office Department in this city. They were sent from various
bogus offices in the large cities, professing to be from agents of
some enterprise or other, which are well enough upon their
face, but upon examination are found to be entirely bogus.
Some of them are schemes for selling counterfeit money.
[Farnsworth proceeded to describe such a scheme.]
191. See supra notes 115-62 and accompanying text.
192. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
193. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
194. Id. at 2879.
195. Id. at n.5 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep.
Farnsworth)).
196. Id. at 2879.
197. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879 n.5 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870)
(remarks of Rep. Farnsworth)).
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Thus all through the country thousands of innocent and unso-
phisticated people, knowing nothing about the ways of these
city thieves and robbers, are continually fleeced and robbed,
and the mails are made use of for the purpose of aiding them in
their nefarious designs."' 8
The Court concluded from this comment that Farnsworth's purpose in
proposing the mail fraud statute was to protect money or property rights.
The counterfeiting scheme mentioned by Representative Farns-
worth was simply an example of one type of scheme that Farnsworth felt
should be covered under the statute.199 Counterfeiting schemes, along
with lotteries and so-called gift concerts, were popular during the late
1800s.2 ° Thus, the counterfeiting example was an effective illustration
for Farnsworth to use, as it presumably was easily understood by Con-
gress. In any event, the scheme to sell counterfeit money was merely one
specific example of a prevalent scheme. Farnsworth's comments do not
suggest that this type of scheme-one that results in a deprivation of
money-is the only type of scheme that he believed should be
prohibited. °1
When Farnsworth's comments are examined in totality, it is appar-
ent that his overall concern was that "innocent and unsophisticated peo-
ple.., are continually fleeced and robbed, and the mails" are used to aid
such schemes.202 The bill's primary purpose, therefore, was to protect
the mails from being used as instruments to aid in the "nefarious de-
signs" of such "thieves and robbers.
2 3
Contrary to the McNally Court's conclusion, 2" the bill contained
nothing about thieves and robbers who specifically take property or
money. Further, the Court's conclusion is not supported by Farns-
worth's language. Innocent people can be "fleeced and robbed" of more
than merely money or property. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger once sug-
gested that the mail fraud statute should remain strong to "cope with the
new varieties of fraud that the ever-inventive American 'con artist' is sure
198. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth) (empha-
sis added).
199. Id.
200. In 1868, Congress enacted the "lottery law," which prohibited the mailing of any let-
ters or circulars "concerning [illegal] lotteries [and] so-called gift concerts." Act of June 27,
1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 196. See generally Rakoff, supra note 4, at 781-82. Rakoff noted
that during the period of "economic turmoil" after the Civil War, "fraudulent lotteries were a
common swindle." Id. at 782.
201. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879.
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to develop."2 °5 While Farnsworth did not explicitly state that all vari-
eties of fraud that these con artists could develop would be covered under
the statute, neither did his remarks limit the statute to frauds involving
only money or property.20 6
The Court's premise that the original impetus behind the mail fraud
statute was to protect only money or property20 7 is also unsupported by
historical analysis. Commentator Jed Rakoff analyzed the statute in the
context of the Reconstructionist era. He concluded that, after the Civil
War, federal intervention was needed to dispel widespread fraud.20 8
Congress reacted by passing statutes "drawn in sweeping language ap-
propriate to the federal government's new-found sense of power. ' 209 The
mail fraud statute was an example of "a host of federal legislation...
that extended federal authority to areas previously reserved to the
states."
2 10
If Rakoff's premise is correct-that Congress' primary purpose in
passing the mail fraud statute was to empower the federal government to
prosecute fraud-there would be no reason to limit the statute to only
fraudulent schemes whereby money or property is lost.211 The McNally
205. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 407 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also
Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941) ("The
variety of means which may be employed in the execution [of a scheme to defraud] is limited
only by the ingenuity of the schemer.").
206. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth).
207. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879.
208. Rakoff, supra note 4, at 780.
209. Id. In the McNally dissent, Justice Stevens discussed legislation enacted by Congress
in the 19th Century. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
noted that "[s]tatutes like the Sherman Act, the civil rights legislation, and the mail fraud
statute were written in broad general language on the understanding that the courts would
have wide latitude in construing them to achieve the remedial purposes that Congress had
identified." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Rakoff, supra note 4, at 779. Rakoff also noted that in 1872, when the original mail
fraud statute was enacted, "doubts of its constitutionality would have been far from idle." Id.
at 786 n.65. Beginning in 1866, the Court struck down several "Radical Reconstructionist"
statutes as unconstitutional, particularly those the Court felt constituted "federal interference
with state or individual preserves that did not find justification in the exercise of some overrid-
ing federal purpose." Id. at 786-87 n.65. Rakof' concluded that "it was but the better part of
prudence for the draftsmen of the original mail fraud statute to include much language in the
statute seemingly directing its thrust toward the protection of the mails, rather than toward
the prosecution of fraud." Id. at 787 n.65.
211. At the time the mail fraud statute was enacted, "fraud" was defined as "to deprive of a
right ... to withhold from another what is justly due him," and "any cunning, deception or
artifice used to circumvent or deceive another." See McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2887 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing 1 BOUviER's LAW DICTIONARY 530 (1897); W. ANDERSON, A DICTION-
ARY OF LAW 474 (1893); 1 BURRILL'S LAW DICTIONARY 658-59 (1859)); see also supra notes
320-27 and accompanying text. Thus, the definition of fraud encompassed deprivations of
more than simply money or property.
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Court did not address this issue, and instead stated the statute's ostensi-
bly clear purpose in conclusory terms.212 The statute's precise purpose,
however, is far from clear. Given the broad aim of much Reconstruc-
tionist legislation, and the fact that the mail fraud statute reflected a
"4manifest... purpose of Congress to utilize its powers.., to protect
people against fraud,1213 a conclusion contrary to the McNally Court's
seems more likely. If the statute's aim was the broader goal of protecting
people against fraud, the Court limited the statute in a manner inconsis-
tent with this goal. The Court's finding of a money or property limita-
tion is not supported by legislative history or historical analysis.21 4
Consequently, the McNally Court's conclusion, that the sole pur-
pose of the mail fraud statute was to protect against schemes that deprive
people of money or property, cannot be supported by legislative history.
Representative Farnsworth's comments merely indicate that the statute's
purpose was to protect the integrity of the mails and prevent them from
being used to aid in fraudulent schemes.215 The record is devoid of any
statement by Farnsworth suggesting that the statute be limited to fraudu-
lent schemes involving money or property. Additionally, the Court's in-
terpretation of the statute is inconsistent with a historical analysis of the
Reconstructionist period.21 6 The mail fraud statute was one of several
federal statutes enacted during this period for the purpose of empowering
the federal government to "dispel widespread fraud.1217 Therefore, an
examination of both the legislative history of the statute and the histori-
cal context in which it was enacted indicates that the statute was not
limited to schemes that deprived a person of money or property. An
analysis of both these areas suggests that protection of intangible rights is
within the statute's scope.
212. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879.
213. Rakoff, supra note 4, at 788 n.72 (quoting Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178,
190 (1948)).
214. The Court's final point concerning the statute's legislative history was that the 1889
amendment, which added examples of popular schemes of the period, "appear[ed] to have
been nothing more than a reconfirmation of the statute's original purpose." McNally, 107 S.
Ct. at 2880 n.6. The Court derived this conclusion from the fact that the examples added by
Congress in 1889 were removed in 1948, when Congress declared the language to be "surplus-
age." Id. (citing Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1341, 62 Stat. 763). At that time, Congress
stated its intent was to simplify the statute without changing its meaning. Id. (citing H.R.
REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A100 (1947)). The 1889 amendment, therefore, is of little
assistance in either supporting or dispelling the Court's conclusion as to the statute's original
purpose.
215. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
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B. Analysis of Durland and the 1909 Amendment
The McNally Court examined the holding of Durland v. United
States21 '8 and the 1909 amendment of the mail fraud statute. 21 9 As the
McNally Court discussed, the Durland decision extended the reach of
the statute to include false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or
222promises. 20 This holding was reflected in the 1909 amendment.221 The
logical leap that the McNally Court took, however, was in concluding
that Durland stood for the proposition that "the phrase [scheme to de-
fraud] is to be interpreted broadly insofar as property rights are con-
cerned." 222  Additionally, the McNally Court viewed the 1909
amendment as giving "further indication that the statute's purpose is
protecting property rights. '223 Neither the Durland Court nor the
amendment stated that the statute's sole purpose was the protection, of
property rights.
1. Durland v. United States
While the McNally Court did not address the facts of Durland in
detail, the Durland facts demonstrate that the McNally Court misstated
the holding of that case. In Durland, the defendant argued that his
fraudulent bond investment scheme did not fall within the mail fraud
statute because the scheme did not fall within the common-law definition
of fraud.224 The defendant noted that, at common law, "fraud ... must
be the misrepresentation of an existing or a past fact, and cannot consist
of the mere intention not to carry out a contract in the future. ' 225 Ac-
cordingly, the defendant asserted the "defense" of false promises-he ar-
gued that since he had only made false promises with respect to whether
or not he would honor the bonds in the future when they became due, his
conduct did not constitute fraud."2 6 The Durland Court rejected this
contention, stating that the statute was broader than the defendant
claimed, since it proscribed "any scheme or artifice to defraud.
'227
Therefore, the Durland Court concluded that "[s]ome schemes may be
promoted through mere representations and promises as to the future,
218. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
219. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2879-80 (1987).
220. Id. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
221. Id. at 2880 (citing Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130).
222. Id. at 2879-80.
223. Id. at 2880.
224. Durland, 161 U.S. at 312-13.
225. Id. at 313.




yet are none the less schemes and artifices to defraud." '28
To justify this conclusion, the Durland Court reasoned that "beyond
the letter of the statute is the evil sought to be remedied, which is always
significant in determining the meaning."22 9 The Court found that the
evil the mail fraud statute sought to remedy was any scheme or plan
which held out the prospect that one would receive more than they
parted with. 30 Therefore, the Court concluded that "[ilt was with the
purpose of protecting the public against... intentional efforts to despoil,
and to prevent the post office from being used to carry [these efforts] into
effect, that this statute was passed." '231 The Durland Court noted that if
the statute were confined to the common-law definition of fraud and lim-
ited to only misrepresentations of existing fact, the statute would be
"strip[ped] . .. of value. '232
Two significant questions were answered in Durland. First, the
Court reasoned that, to carry out the purpose of the mail fraud statute,
the meaning of fraud had to be expanded beyond the common-law defini-
tion.233 The Durland Court broadly defined the word "fraud," holding
that future misrepresentations were to be included within the meaning of
the word within the context of the mail fraud statute.234 The Court,
however, did not address the issue of whether only property was included
within the statute's scope. Therefore, contrary to the McNally Court's
assertion, the Durland Court did not hold that "the phrase [scheme to
defraud] is to be interpreted broadly insofar as property rights are con-
cerned., 231 In fact, the Court in Durland held nothing insofar as prop-
erty rights were concerned, and only addressed expanding the reading of
the word "fraud" with respect to future misrepresentations generally.
The McNally Court failed to consider the second important issue
addressed in Durland-the articulation of the statute's purpose. Accord-
ing to the Durland Court, the statute was written to protect the public
against "intentional efforts to despoil," and to prevent the post office
from being used as the instrumentality to carry such schemes into ef-
fect.236 Prior to McNally, some circuit courts had viewed the Durland
decision as calling for a broad interpretation of the mail fraud statute-
228. Id. at 313.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 314.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 313.
234. Id.
235. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879-80 (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896)).
236. Durland, 161 U.S. at 314.
November 1988]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
that "the purpose [of the mail fraud statute] is to prevent the post office
department from being used to carry out fraudulent schemes, ' 237 or to
"prohibit the misuse of the mails to further fraudulent enterprises. '23
Based on these interpretations of the statute's purpose, numerous courts
had concluded that a victim need not lose money or property to invoke
the statute.239
These courts' interpretation of Durland regarding the statute's pur-
pose followed from the Durland Court's statement that the statute is to
protect against "intentional efforts to despoil."2 4° Black's Law Diction-
ary defines "despoil" as a "means by which one is deprived of that which
he possesses." 24 Since a person can possess much more than money or
property-for example, constitutional or civil rights-a scheme that de-
prives one of rights other than money or property is still an "intentional
effort to despoil." As long as the mails are used to execute such a
scheme, the conduct would fall within the purpose of the mail fraud stat-
ute as set forth in Durland.242 The McNally Court ignored the purpose
of the mail fraud statute as expressed in Durland, and therefore reached
the incorrect conclusion that only schemes involving money or property
were within the statute's reach. Properly read, however, Durland did not
indicate that intangible rights were outside the scope of the mail fraud
statute.
2. The 1909 amendment
In addition to its use of Durland, the McNally Court also cited the
1909 amendment as support for its interpretation of the purpose of the
mail fraud statute.2 43 The McNally Court found that the 1909 codifica-
tion of Durland indicated that "the statute's purpose is protecting prop-
erty rights." 2" The Court drew this conclusion from the fact that the
amended statute prohibited "any scheme or artifice to defraud or for ob-
237. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1358 (4th Cir.), aff'd in relevant part, 602
F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), petition for writ of error coram
nobis granted, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987).
238. United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909
(1974).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v.
Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1982); Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1362; States, 488 F.2d at 764.
240. Durland, 161 U.S. at 314. See supra text accompanying note 231.
241. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (5th ed. 1979).
242. Durland, 161 U.S. at 314.
243. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2880 (citing Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat.
1130).
244. d (citing Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130).
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taining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, rep-
resentations or promises."245 The McNally Court seemed to suggest
that, even though the two phrases--"scheme or artifice to defraud" or
"for obtaining money or property by means of false ... pretenses"-
appear in the disjunctive, they are not to be read independently. There-
fore, the Court concluded that the "money or property" requirement
modifies both "schemes to defraud," and schemes that involve "false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises." 2'
The Court's reading of these two phrases is a curious statutory con-
struction. As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in McNally:
As the language makes clear, each of these restrictions is in-
dependent.... Until today, it was... obvious that one could
violate the first clause by devising a scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, even though one did not violate the second clause by
seeking to obtain money or property from his victim through
false pretenses. ... Every court to consider the matter has so
held. Yet, today, the Court, for all practical purposes, rejects
this longstanding construction of the statute by imposing a re-
quirement that a scheme or artifice to defraud does not violate
the statute unless its purpose is to defraud someone of money
or property.... Certainly no canon of statutory construction
requires us to ignore the plain language of the provision.247
Therefore, Justice Stevens viewed principles of statutory construction as
mandating reading the two phrases disjunctively, rather than conjunc-
tively, as the Court held.
Justice Stevens is indeed correct in stating that the longstanding
construction of the statute was to read the two phrases as they were writ-
ten-in the disjunctive.248 For example, in United States v. States,249 the
defendants argued that the "money or property" limitation in the second
phrase revealed that "Congress believed that the first phrase in the origi-
nal legislation dealt only with schemes to defraud of money or prop-
erty."25 The Eighth Circuit responded:
[A] reading of the statute as a whole reveals that the two
245. Id. (citing Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. See, e.g., Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 121; United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7, 9 (4th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Loudernan, 576 F.2d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
896 (1978); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974); States, 488 F.2d at 764.
249. 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
250. Id. at 764.
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phrases in question are part of an uninterrupted listing of a se-
ries of obviously diverse schemes which result in criminal sanc-
tions if the mails are used. The more natural construction of
the wording in the statute is to view the two phrases indepen-
dently, rather than complementary of one another.25
Thus, the Eighth Circuit's position was in accord with that of Justice
Stevens in McNally--that the two phrases should be read disjunctively.
Under the Eighth Circuit's construction, a scheme to defraud need not
involve a loss of money or property.252 The McNally Court's conjunctive
reading, despite the fact that the plain language of the statute is in the
disjunctive, does not comport with common sense.
3. Commentary supporting the Court's statutory construction
The McNally Court did not clearly set forth its reasoning of why the
phrases "scheme to defraud" or "for obtaining money or property by
means of false pretenses" are not to be read disjunctively or indepen-
dently. The Court simply stated that the erroneous disjunctive reading
resulted in the intangible rights doctrine.2 53 However, several years prior
to McNally, a commentator set forth a theory which stated that the
phrases were not meant to be read independently.254 The McNally Court
did not state that it was following this commentator's theory. However,
the commentator's analysis may illuminate the Court's reasoning on this
point.
This commentator stated that in codifying the Durland decision in
1909, Congress meant to "expand narrowly the crime of mail fraud by
removing" the common-law defense of false promises.255 Accordingly, if
the amendment merely added a separate crime concerned with obtaining
money or property, the amendment would have been unnecessary. After
all, the mail fraud statute had been used to prosecute crimes against
property well before 1909.26 Therefore, for the amendment to have any
meaning, it must have added something different from a crime to obtain
money or property. Specifically, the commentator's theory suggested
that rather than adding a crime to obtain money or property, the purpose
of the amendment was to simply clarify that the defense of false promises
was not available in a prosecution for "a scheme to defraud."2 7
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2880.
254. Intangible-Rights, supra note 18.





The commentator additionally stated that "reading the two phrases
independently [would] defeat[] Congress's aim of codifying Durland; the
common-law defense, under such a reading, would be available when the
defendant is prosecuted for schemes to defraud rather than for schemes
to obtain money or property by false or fraudulent pretenses." '258 In
other words, if the phrases are read independently, one could not "obtain
money or property by means of false... promises," as that would clearly
be prohibited by the statute. However, "a scheme to defraud" could be
conducted by means of false promises and not fall within the statute, as
false promises would not modify a scheme to defraud.259
The commentator reasoned that reading the phrases independently
would be inconsistent with basic principles of statutory construction.2 °
Consequently, his theory stated that the phrase "for obtaining money or
property" only served to illustrate what was comprehended by schemes
to defraud; "by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or
promises" applied to all schemes to defraud.2 61 Therefore, the commen-
tator concluded that "Congress codified Durland's interpretation of 'any
scheme or artifice to defraud' as applicable only to crimes against
property."262
This theory is flawed for several reasons. First, the commentator
stated that if the amendment added a separate crime of obtaining money
or property, it would have been unnecessary, as crimes against property
had been prosecuted since before 1909.263 It is true that crimes against
property had been prosecuted under the statute prior to 1909;264 how-
ever, the issue of whether the mail fraud statute encompassed crimes by
means offalse promises was not considered until Durland.265 In that re-
spect the amendment was not at all unnecessary. It added an entirely
new element to the statute-namely that crimes to obtain money or
property by means of false promises were now proscribed under the
258. Id.
259. To state the commentator's proposition another way, the statute clearly proscribed a
scheme to obtain money or property by means of false promises. However, under the disjunc-
tive reading, the statute would not proscribe a scheme to defraud by means of false promises.
Id. According to the commentator, this would be inconsistent with the purpose of the 1909
recodification, since the purpose of the recodification was to make clear that a scheme to de-
fraud by means of false promises was within the statute's scope. Id. Therefore, the two
phrases cannot be read disjunctively. Id.
260. Id. at n.60.
261. Id. at 571-72.
262. Id. at 572.
263. Id. at 571.
264. See, eg., Culp v. United States, 82 F. 990 (3rd Cir. 1897); United States v. Watson, 35
F. 358 (E.D.N.C. 1888); United States v. Jones, 10 F. 469 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882).
265. Durland, 161 U.S. at 313.
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statute.266
Second, the commentator stated that reading the phrases indepen-
dently would mean that the defense of false promises would be available
when a defendant is prosecuted for a scheme to defraud.2 67 There is
nothing illogical in this reading at all. Congress may reasonably have
intended that the defense of false promises would only be available for
schemes to defraud, and would not be available to a scheme to obtain
money or property. This is logical, considering that the Durland Court
expanded the definition of fraud beyond its common-law basis.268 Con-
gress may have wanted to limit that expansion by only allowing the de-
fense to schemes to defraud. Congress wrote the amendment with this
limitation clearly delineated, and it would be inconsistent to conclude it
intended otherwise.
2 69
Finally, the commentator's theory concluded that the phrase "for
obtaining money or property" merely illustrates what was already com-
prehended by schemes to defraud-that all schemes to defraud must in-
volve money or property.270 If the money or property requirement
simply reiterated a requirement already implicit within the phrase "any
scheme to defraud," then the language of the amendment would be re-
dundant. This reading would conflict with basic principles of statutory
construction. 271 Rather than interpret the amendment to include super-
fluous language and disjunctives that have no meaning, or to read the
statute to say something other than that which it clearly says, the more
logical view is to read the statute as it was written-as two separate,
independent phrases. Under this reading, it would be possible to violate
the first phrase without violating the requirements of the second phrase,
yet still commit mail fraud.
272
266. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130.
267. Intangible-Rights, supra note 18, at 571.
268. Durland, 161 U.S. at 312-13.
269. As the commentator himself noted, "[i]t is the duty of the court to give effect, if possi-
ble, to every word and clause [sic] of a statute." Intangible-Rights, supra note 18, at 571 n.60
(quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882)).
270. Id. at 571-72.
271. See generally SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. (4th ed. 1985).
272. In other words, it would be possible to violate the mail fraud statute by: (1) engaging
in a scheme to defraud; or (2) engaging in a scheme to obtain money or property by means of
false pretenses. To violate part (1), a person need only engage in a scheme to defraud; there is
no requirement that such a scheme involve a loss of money or property. The language of the




4. Conclusion: Durland and the 1909 amendment
Contrary to the McNally Court's interpretation, the Durland deci-
sion lends support to the intangible rights doctrine by articulating a
broad statutory purpose. 7 3 While Durland expanded the definition of
"defraud" beyond the term's common-law meaning, the Court did not
hold that "defraud" involves only property rights. Additionally, the
Durland Court concluded that the purpose of the statute was to "protect
the public against... intentional efforts to despoil" and to prevent the
post office from being used to carry out such fraudulent enterprises.274
With this as the statute's purpose, it would be inconsistent to limit the
statute to only schemes involving loss of money or property.
The 1909 amendment also does not support the McNally Court's
assertion that "the statute's purpose is in protecting property rights."
The Court based its conclusion on reading the two phrases "scheme or
artifice to defraud" and "for obtaining money or property by means of
false.., pretenses" conjunctively. The Court offered no reason why any
"canon of statutory construction [would] require[] [it] to ignore the plain
language of the provision. ' 271 If the Court reached this conclusion by
employing the same reasoning as the commentator discussed above,
2 7 6
then the theory, cannot withstand careful scrutiny. There is simply no
justification for ignoring the plain language of the provision. The statute
contains no requirement that a "scheme to defraud" must involve a loss
of money or property.
C. Analysis of the Majority's Interpretation of the Word "Defraud"
The McNally Court next discussed the meaning of the word "de-
fraud. ' 277 Three relevant interpretations of the word "defraud" are ex-
amined in this section. The first discussion focuses on the term as defined
by the McNally Court, based on the way the term is used in 18 U.S.C.
section 371 (the conspiracy statute).27 Second, the use of the term "de-
fraud," as used in regulation 10b-5 promulgated pursuant to the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, is examined.279 Finally, this section discusses
dictionary definitions of "defraud" from the late 19th century when the
mail fraud statute was enacted.
273. Durland, 161 U.S. at 313.
274. Id. at 314.
275. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
276. See supra notes 255-72 and accompanying text.
277. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2880-81 (1987).
278. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
279. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
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1. "Defraud" as used in the criminal conspiracy statute
As additional support for the holding that the mail fraud statute
reaches only schemes that deprive an individual of money or property,
the McNally Court noted that the words "to defraud" commonly refer to
"'wronging one in his property fights by dishonest methods or
schemes.' "28 This definition of "defraud" is found in Hammerschmidt
v. United States,2"' a case that discussed the predecessor to 18 U.S.C.
section 371.282 That statute rendered criminal any conspiracy "to de-
fraud the United States... for any purpose.
' 283
In Hammerschmidt, the Court considered whether pecuniary loss
must have been inflicted on the government for the defendant's acts to
fall within the statute.2"4 The Court's complete statement on this issue
was as follows:
To conspire to defraud the United States means primarily to
cheat the Government out of property or money, but it also
means to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful govern-
mental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by
means that are dishonest. It is not necessary that the Govern-
ment shall be subjected to property or pecuniary loss by the
fraud. ... [T]he words "to defraud" ... usually signify the
deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or
overreaching. They do not extend to theft by violence. They
refer rather to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest
methods or schemes.28 5
Thus, Hammerschmidt stated that a loss of money or property need not
have been inflicted on the government for the criminal acts to fall within
the statute.
Consequently, the Hammerschmidt quotation does not support the
McNally Court's proposition that "defraud" refers only to a deprivation
of property rights. While the Hammerschmidt Court did use the phrase
quoted in McNally that "defraud" refers to property rights, the Ham-
merschmidt Court also stated that "defraud" refers to the "deprivation of
something of value," and specifically stated that money or property loss
280. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2880-81 (citing Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182,
188 (1924)).
281. 265 U.S. 182 (1924).
282. Id.
283. Act of March 2, 1867, § 30, 14 Stat. 471, currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
See supra note 27 for pertinent text of statute.
284. Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 187.
285. Id. at 188 (emphasis added).
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is not necessary.2s6 "Something of value" could thus refer to constitu-
tional or civil rights such as the right to honest government or the right
to privacy.
The Hammerschmidt Court held that pecuniary or property loss to
the government was not necessary for one to be convicted of defrauding
the government under this statute.2 7 The holding reaffirmed a line of
cases that explicitly recognized that "it is not essential to charge or prove
an actual financial or property loss to make a case under [section
371].11288 Therefore, the term "defraud," as used in the context of section
371, clearly does not refer solely to deprivations of money or property.
The term refers to "depriving [the government] of its lawful right.
219
286. Id. While the Hammerschmidt Court stated that defraud refers to "wronging one in
his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes," the Court also stated that defraud signi-
fies the "deprivation of something of value." Id. These two definitions of the word defraud
may be viewed as somewhat conflicting.
Immediately preceding the statement that "defraud" refers to wronging one in his "prop-
erty rights" is the idea that the term "defraud" does not extend to thefts by violence. It is
possible that the Hammerschmidt Court was trying to draw a distinction between what fraud
generally extends to, and what it does not. An earlier circuit decision held that "defraud" in
the context of the mail fraud statute extended to the act of sending threatening letters.
Horman v. United States, 116 F. 350 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902). Ham-
merschmidt considered Horman a questionable decision in its broad interpretation of the word
"defraud," as the element of deceit was lacking from a scheme that simply involved threats.
Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188-89.
The question of whether fraud extended to violent acts with respect to the mail fraud
statute was answered negatively by the Court two years later in Fasulo v. United States, 272
U.S. 620 (1926). In Fasulo, the Court held that the use of the mails to obtain money by means
of threats of murder or bodily harm does not constitute a scheme to defraud within the mean-
ing of the mail fraud statute. Id. at 628.
Therefore, in trying to make the point that fraud does not encompass theft by violence,
the Hammerschmidt Court went on to state what fraud does encompass in narrow language.
Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188. In any event, the Hammerschmidt statement that fraud
applies to property rights is inconsistent with that Court's statement earlier in the opinion that
fraud applies to "something of value." Id. The statement also must be read in conjunction
with the Court's earlier statement that fraud refers primarily to deprivations of property or
money. Id. Finally, the ultimate holding of Hammerschmidt clearly states that a finding of
pecuniary loss is not necessary for a conviction of conspiracy to "defraud" the government.
Id.
Indeed, in his dissent in McNally, Justice Stevens stated that "[i]t is extraordinary that the
only support the Court presents for its narrow definition [of the term 'defraud'] is some lan-
guage in Hammerschmidt,... even though Hammerschmidt itself goes on to expressly reject
the notion that fraud is limited to interference of property rights." McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2886
n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
287. Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188.
288. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 480 (1910); see also United States v. Keitel, 211 U.S.
370, 394 (1908); Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62 (1905); McGregor v. United States, 134 F. 187
(4th Cir. 1904); Curley v. United States, 130 F. 1 (1st Cir.) cert denied, 195 U.S. 628 (1904).
289. Haas, 216 U.S. at 480 ("That it is not essential to charge or prove actual financial or
property loss to make a case under the statute has been more than once ruled.").
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The McNally Court conceded that other cases considering the con-
spiracy statute had held that the statute "reaches conspiracies other than
those directed at property interests." ' However, the Court distin-
guished those cases by noting that the conspiracy statute involves consid-
erations inapplicable to the mail fraud statute.291 Specifically, the Court
noted that "[a] statute which.., has for its object the protection of the
individual property rights of the members of the civic body, is one thing;
a statute which has for its object the protection and welfare of the gov-
ernment alone, which exists for the purpose of administering itself in the
interests of the public, [is] quite another." '292 The Court accordingly de-
termined that since the conspiracy statute protects the government, the
term "defraud" was intended to have a broader meaning in the context of
that statute. Conversely, in the Court's view, since the mail fraud statute
"had its origin in the desire to protect individual property rights," the
term "defraud" was intended to be more narrowly limited to the protec-
tion of property rights.293
In determining that the narrow definition of "defraud" should apply
to the mail fraud statute, the Court's reasoning is circular. The Court
began with the premise that the mail fraud statute's original purpose was
to protect property rights.294 The Court then concluded that the term
"defraud," within the context of the mail fraud statute, is limited to
property rights.295 This conclusion was based on the Court's view of the
statute's purpose. However, the Court derived its original premise of the
statute's purpose from, in part, the meaning of the word "defraud.
296
Thus, the original premise was derived in part from the conclusion,
which was derived from the original premise.
Quite apart from this convoluted logic, the Court did not provide a
substantive justification for treating government and individual rights
differently under the two statutes. The Court simply stated that "indi-
vidual property rights... [are] one thing [and] the government... [is]
quite another."'2 97 While this statement is true, it does not adequately
290. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881 n.8 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62
(1942); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 480 (1910); Curley v. United States, 130 F. 1, 6-7 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 195 U.S. 628 (1904)).
291. Id.
292. Id. (citing Curley v. United States, 130 F. 1, 7 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 195 U.S. 628
(1904)).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2879.
295. Id. at 2879-80.
296. Id. at 2880-81.




afford a reason why two statutes, enacted five years apart and using iden-
tical language, should be given two entirely different meanings. There is
neither a basis in history nor evidence of legislative intent regarding the
conspiracy statute to indicate that Congress intended the conspiracy stat-
ute to have a broader reach than the mail fraud statute.
Moreover, the Court determined that the mail fraud statute should
have a more limited definition of "defraud" because the statute was origi-
nally designed to benefit private individuals rather than the govern-
ment.298  This assessment is not precisely accurate. The statute was
originally enacted to protect the mails from being used as instruments to
aid in the "nefarious designs" of "thieves and robbers. '299 The statute's
purpose, therefore, was to protect the integrity of the United States Post
Office, in addition to private individuals.3 °° Thus, there is no persuasive
reason to use the term "defraud" in a different way in the mail fraud
statute than it is used in section 371. Even accepting that there may-be a
plausible justification to treat government and individual rights differ-
ently in two similar statutes, the Court has inaccurately characterized the
purpose of the mail fraud statute so that it will fit within its rationale.
2. "Defraud" as used in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Court did not examine the use of the term "defraud" in any
other federal statutes. However, rule 10b-5, promulgated under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("10b-5") 30 1 uses language
similar to the mail fraud statute by making it unlawful "to employ any
device, scheme or artifice to defraud" in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.3 2  In interpreting the scope of rule 10b-5, the
298. Id. See supra notes 292-93 and accompanying text.
299. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth).
300. See, e.g., Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314; United States v. Rendini, 738
F.2d 530, 533 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1358 (4th Cir.), aff'd in
relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), petition for writ of
error coram nobis granted, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987); United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d
492, 498 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974); see also McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
301. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
302. 17 C.F.R. § 240.101-5. Section 10(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat.
891, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982), prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe." Id at § 78j(b). Pursu-
ant to this section, the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] promulgated rule lOb-5,
which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States30 3 held that an "insider"
trading in securities using inside information may be criminally liable
under the rule, regardless of whether anyone suffered an actual loss of
money or property. 3 4
Liability in these cases has been premised on finding that the insider
took "advantage of [inside] information knowing it [was] unavailable to
... the investing public." 305 According to the Securities and Exchange
Commission [SEC], a corporate insider must abstain from trading unless
he has first disclosed all material inside information known to him.
306 If
the insider does not disclose material information and trades based on
that information, he is liable for violating the provisions of rule lOb-5.3 °7
For a criminal violation, there need be no showing that anyone has suf-
fered a monetary or property loss from such trading.
308
In Dirks v. SEC,30 9 the Supreme Court held that "fraud" in the con-
text of rule lOb-5 derived from the" 'inherent unfairness involved where
one takes advantage' of 'information intended to be available for a corpo-
rate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.' "310 This defini-
tion is in accord with the definition of "fraud" used by the circuit courts
applying the intangible rights doctrine under the mail fraud statute. For
example, in United States v. Keane,31' the Seventh Circuit stated that it
was "actionable under the mail fraud statute for [a public official] to
make use of inside advance information obtained by virtue of his official
position for his own personal gain.' ' 312 Under this view, the mail fraud
intangible rights concept is virtually indistinguishable from the concept
of fraud as defined by the Dirks Court under a rule lOb-5 violation.
303. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
304. Id. at 229 (liability must be premised on a duty to either disclose or abstain); see also
Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (insider must either disclose non-public material information or abstain
from trading in securities).
305. Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
306. Id. at 911.
307. Id.
308. See id; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229; Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
309. 463 U.S. 646 (1980).
310. Id. at 654 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933,
936 (1968)).
311. 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976),petition for writ of error
coram nobis denied, 678 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff'd, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988).
312. Id. at 545. See also United States v. Groves, 122 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 670 (1941) (use of inside information by corporate officers for personal benefit constitutes
mail fraud); United States v. Buckner, 108 F.2d 921, 926 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 669
(1940) (obtaining secret profits based upon inside information constitutes active fraud for pur-
poses of mail fraud statute).
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Further, the Dirks Court stated that "fraud" within a violation of
rule lOb-5 resulted when one failed to disclose material nonpublic infor-
mation and made "secret profits." ' Similarly, in McNally, Gray was
charged with failing to disclose his arrangement with Wombwell to other
persons who might have been affected by the disclosure, thereby gaining
a personal financial advantage. 14 The Court in McNally, however, re-
fused to find that profiting from governmental decisions and concealing a
personal financial interest "defrauds the State."31 Under the reasoning
employed by the Court in analyzing "fraud" within a rule lOb-5 viola-
tion, Gray's conduct should have fallen squarely within the statute.
The McNally Court did not address why the term "defraud" should
be accorded a broader meaning within the Securities Exchange Act than
within the mail fraud statute. The rationale that the term should have a
broad meaning when the government is the object of the statute's protec-
313. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654. In Dirks, the Court stated that a rule lOb-5 insider trading
violation requires two elements: "'(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of
allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclo-
sure.'" Id. at 654 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980)).
Moreover, the Court in Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654, noted that "not 'all breaches of fiduciary
duty in connection with a securities transaction,' however, come within the ambit of Rule lOb-
5." Id. (quoting Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)). There must
also be some manipulation or deception. Id. Similarly, in applying the mail fraud statute in
intangible rights cases, circuit courts also required a breach of duty coupled with deception.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Under the Court's 10b-5 interpretation, "fraud" resulted when a person used his position
of trust and confidence to perpetrate a deception on others. Compare Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
227 (10b-5 violated when failure of fiduciary to disclose material information in order to re-
ceive a benefit) with Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1364 (mail fraud statute violated when deliberate
concealment of facts in order to receive a benefit). Thus, the circuit courts that applied the
intangible rights doctrine used a definition of "fraud" wholly consistent with that set forth by
the Court under rule lob-5.
314. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2882 n.9.
315. Id. The Court stated that:
The violation asserted is the failure to disclose [Gray and McNally's] financial inter-
est, even if state law did not require it, to other persons in the state government
whose actions could have been affected by the disclosure.... [I]f state law expressly
permitted or did not forbid a state officer such as Gray to have an ownership interest
in an insurance agency handling the State's insurance, it would take a much clearer
indication than the mail fraud statute evidences to convince us that having and con-
cealing such an interest defrauds the State and is forbidden under federal law.
Id. Concealment of material information to obtain a personal advantage over the investing
public constitutes "fraud" as the Court defined it under rule lOb-5. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
The Court's reluctance to find that a similar concealment defrauds the state is particularly
inconsistent with the Court's analysis of "defraud" under section 371, considering the Court
seemed willing to afford a broader meaning to the term "defraud" when the government is the
object of a statute's protection. See supra notes 290-98 and accompanying text.
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tion is not applicable to rule lOb-5. 3 16 According to the Court, the pur-
pose of rule lOb-5 is to "prevent inequitable and unfair practices on...
[the] market. ' 317 Thus, rule lOb-5 is aimed at protecting the investing
public.3"' Given that the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is to
protect individual rights, and that this act uses a broad definition of the
word "defraud," it becomes even more difficult to comprehend why the
McNally Court treated the term differently in the mail fraud statute.3 19
3. "Defraud" in dictionary definitions of the late 19th century
The McNally Court did not consider dictionary definitions of the
term "defraud." However, there is ample evidence that in the late 19th
century, when the mail fraud statute was enacted, the term "defraud"
did not have two different definitions, one broad and one narrow, de-
pending on whom the statute was protecting.3 20 Dictionaries from the
period do not define the word "defraud" as limited to deprivations of
money or property rights. 321 Rather, the word was defined as "to de-
prive of a right by an act of fraud.., to withhold from another what is
justly due him.' '322 Additionally, Justice Story, in his commentary, Eq-
uity Jurisprudence, defined the term as "any cunning, deception, or arti-
fice used to circumvent[,] cheat or deceive another.
3 23
Given that, in the late 19th century, "defraud" meant "to deprive of
a right", it is untenable to conclude that intangible rights should not be
accorded protection under the mail fraud statute, from either a legal or
linguistic standpoint.324 "Defraud" during the late 19th Century simply
316. See supra notes 290-93 and accompanying text.
317. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975).
318. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227; Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
319. In McNally, the Court attempted to distinguish the broad reach of "defraud" as used
in the conspiracy statute, from the narrow reach of "defraud" that it applied to the mail fraud
statute. 107 S. Ct. at 2881 n.8. According to the Court, the mail fraud statute had its origin in
the protection of individual rights, and thus, "any benefit which the Government derives from
the statute must be limited to the Government's interests as property-holder." Id. The Court
did not elaborate on why the Government's benefit under the statute must be limited, simply
because the statute's origin was the protection of individual rights. See supra notes 290-93 and
accompanying text. In any event, the court concluded that since the mail fraud statute had its
origin in protecting individual rights, it could not be afforded as expansive a reach as the
conspiracy statute. Id. This distinction fails to explain why rule lob-5, which protects only
individual rights, is afforded as expansive a reach as the conspiracy statute.
320. See McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2887 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 1 BOUVIER'S LAw
DICTIONARY 530 (1897); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAw 474 (1893); 1 BURRILL'S
LAW DICTIONARY 658-59 (1859)).
321. Id.
322. Id. (quoting W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 474 (1893)).
323. Id. (quoting 1 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 186, 189-90 (1870)).
324. Intangible rights include constitutional rights, such as the right to privacy, United
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did not mean what the McNally Court contended. Further, since "intan-
gible rights" often include political, civil or constitutional rights,325 they
are "rights" at least on an equal footing to tangible property rights. In
holding that only property rights are entitled to protection under the
mail fraud statute, and that civil and constitutional rights are not, the
McNally Court has taught an odd lesson.326 As Justice Stevens stated:
Can it be that Congress sought to purge the mails of schemes to
defraud citizens of money but was willing to tolerate schemes
to defraud citizens of their right to an honest government, or to
unbiased public officials? Is it at all rational to assume that
Congress wanted to ensure that the mails not be used for petty
crimes, but did not prohibit election fraud accomplished
through mailing fictitious ballots? Given Congress' "broad
purpose," I "find it difficult to believe, absent some indication
in the statute itself or the legislative history, that Congress
would have undercut sharply that purpose by hobbling federal
prosecutors in their effort to combat" use of the mails for fraud-
ulent schemes.327
The McNally Court's conclusion that the statute only reaches schemes
that deprive one of property rights, but does not cover constitutional or
civil rights, results in an "irrational" interpretation of Congress' intent.
States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978), and civil
rights, such as the right to have elections conducted free of fraud, United States v. States, 488
F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974), and the right to honest services of
government officials, Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1362. Justice Stevens noted that the common-law
criminalized frauds such as these, in which no money or property was lost. McNally, 107 S.
Ct. at 2887 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Trial of Regina v. Valentine Jones, 31 How.St.Tr.
251 (1809)) (public official convicted for depriving government of honest services).
325. See, eg., Louderman, 576 F.2d at 1387; United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245,
1249 (8th Cir. 1976); States, 488 F. 2d at 767; see also cases cited supra note 324.
326. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879. Prosecuting only crimes that cause a deprivation of
money or property can have curious results as well. For example, following McNally, three
charges of mail fraud were dropped against a judge. United States v. McCollom, No. 86 CR
410 (N.D. III. March 5, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). These charges were based on
the theory that, by accepting bribes to fix drunk driving cases, the judge had defrauded citizens
of their intangible right to have their cases decided honestly. There was no allegation that the
city had lost money or property, and consequently, the mail fraud charges could not be sus-
tained. However, prosecutors sought to maintain one other mail fraud charge against this
judge for accepting bribes to fix parking tickets. That count could be sustained even in light of
McNally, prosecutors contended, since it was arguable that the city lost parking ticket revenue.
See Chi. Daily L. Bull., July 1, 1987, at 1, col. 3-4. Thus, accepting bribes to fix drunk driving
cases might not be within mail fraud, but accepting bribes to fix parking tickets might. After
McNally, criminality in a case like this might not be based on the judge's conduct, but on what
type of cases a judge "fixes."
327. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2885 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting McElroy v. United
States, 455 U.S. 642, 655 (1982)).
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4. Conclusion: the definition of "defraud"
In sum, the McNally Court's analysis of the meaning of 'defraud"
as used in the mail fraud statute contains several difficulties. First, it
does not appear from dictionary definitions published in the late 19th
century that the meaning of fraud was limited to property rights.3 8 Sec-
ond, other federal statutes that use the word "defraud" do not restrict its
meaning to deprivations of property rights.3 2 9 Third, while the Court
tried to draw a distinction between the use of the term "defraud" in the
conspiracy statute and in the mail fraud statute, the Court mischaracter-
ized the purposes of the latter.330 Additionally, the Court's reasoning is
not firmly based on either legislative history or legal authority. Finally,
the conclusion that property rights are worthy of protection under the
mail fraud statute, while constitutional and civil rights are not,33 1 is
disturbing.
D. Analysis of the Majority's Reading of the Statute
As further support for its narrow interpretation of the mail fraud
statute, the McNally Court stated that "when there are two rational
readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to
choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite
language. ' '3 32 This language echoes a familiar rule that in construing
criminal statutes, doubts are to be resolved in favor of the defendant.333
There are two principles behind this policy. "First, 'a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the common world will
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.' ",331
"Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because
criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the
community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal
activity.
3 35
The Supreme Court has followed the rule of lenity numerous times
328. See supra notes 320-24 and accompanying text.
329. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982), supra notes 280-300 and accompanying text; 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1982) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987), supra notes 301-19 and accompanying text.
330. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881 n.8.
331. Id. at 2879.
332. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1987) (quoting United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)).
333. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); see also Liparota v. United States, 471
U.S. 419, 427 (1985); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980); Bell v. United States,
349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
334. Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
335. Id.
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in construing criminal statutes.336 In some cases, the Court's principal
concern has been that "interpret[ing] the statute otherwise would be to
criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct. ' 337  The
Court has used this rationale when a criminal statute is challenged as
"void for vagueness" because it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelli-
gence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute.
'338
1. The "void for vagueness" challenge
The McNally Court was clearly cognizant of the "void for vague-
ness" challenge to the mail fraud statute.339 This awareness is demon-
strated by the statement that before one can be punished for a criminal
offense, "it must be shown that his case is plainly within the statute.
'" 340
Here, the Court's fear was that circuit courts construing the statute did
so in a manner that left its "outer boundaries ambiguous," and therefore,
the statute as interpreted by the circuit courts would include some con-
duct that was not proscribed under the statute.34 1 While the Court did
not elaborate in detail on this issue, its concern seemed to be that no
specific definition of what constituted a "scheme to defraud" had ever
been firmly adopted by the circuits.342
336. See, eg., Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) (refusal to extend the National
Stolen Property Act to cover transportation of bootleg phonograph records); Liparota, 471
U.S. at 434 (refusal to extend statute covering federal food stamp fraud); Williams v. United
States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982) (refusal to extend application of federal statute to check kiting
scheme).
337. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426; see also Williams, 458 U.S. at 286.
338. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (quoting United States
v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)); see also Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926) (as a matter of due process, a law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application").
339. Although the Court did not specifically discuss the "void for vagueness" theory, that
argument was presented by defendant James Gray. His brief contended that "it is virtually
impossible for a person of average intelligence to determine what is declared by the [mail
fraud] statute." Brief for Petitioner Gray at 10, McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875
(1987) (86-928).
340. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881 (quoting Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 629
(1926)).
341. Id.
342. The mail fraud statute had come under the "vagueness" attack in the past. See United
States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980). There, the
court rejected the claim, stating:
A vagueness challenge will not be upheld if judicial explication of a statute provides
sufficient clarity to afford fair notice. The numerous decisions which have applied
[the mail fraud statute]... to the deprivation of intangible rights in general afforded
the defendant reasonable notice that his conduct might well fall within the proscrip-
tions of the mail fraud statute.
Id. at 1174.
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This concern is not without merit. The intangible rights doctrine
was largely a judicial creation, developed over the years by judges who
agreed with the principle set forth in Shushan v. United States,343 that
"[n]o trustee has more sacred duties than a public official."' 344 This basic
proposition led to the belief that a public official who breaches that fidu-
ciary duty by failing to disclose a material interest or by accepting bribes
has engaged in a scheme to defraud citizens of their right to honest gov-
ernment. 345  However, the kind of conduct that constituted such a
scheme was never precisely delineated.
Several circuit courts have commented on the type of conduct that
constitutes a "scheme to defraud." The Fifth Circuit observed in Blachly
v. United States:346
The fraudulent aspect of the scheme to "defraud" is measured
by a nontechnical standard. Law puts its imprimatur on the
accepted moral standards and condemns conduct which fails to
match the "reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental
honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and business
life of members of society." This is indeed broad.347
Under the Blachly standard, a scheme to defraud could result from con-
duct that a court has determined did not comport with its notion of ac-
cepted moral standards.
On one hand, some courts have found that this expansive interpreta-
tion was justified, since limiting the mail fraud statute to deprivations of
tangible interests might weaken the statute by excluding from its scope
schemes that deprive people of significant intangible rights.3 48 On the
343. 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
344. Id. at 115. See also United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362 (4th Cir.), aff'd in
relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980),petitionfor writ of
error coram nobis granted, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d
1124, 1150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
345. See, eg., Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1362. In Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 120-29, this theory was
extended even further to cover an individual who was not a public official, but who partici-
pated substantially in governmental affairs. The Margiotta court held that a person who makes
governmental decisions may be considered a "government fiduciary" under the theory that
such a person has "de facto control." Id. at 122. See infra text accompanying note 431 for
further discussion of Margiotta and the "de facto" control test.
346. 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967).
347. Id. at 671 (citation omitted) (quoting Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th
Cir. 1958)); see also United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 994 (1979); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 545 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 976 (1976), petition for writ of error coram nobis denied, 678 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill.
1987), aff'd, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988).
348. See Van Dyke, 605 F.2d at 225 (6th Cir.); Keane, 522 F.2d at 545.
Vol. 22:325
November 1988] PROSECUTING PUBLIC CORRUPTION
other hand, not all circuits have agreed with the Fifth Circuit's view in
Blachly.349 Blachly's broad language encompassed schemes that not only
deprived people of intangible rights, but also those that failed to live up
to "accepted moral conduct," whatever that may be. The Seventh Cir-
cuit has remarked:
[T]he words 'scheme or artifice to defraud' don't reach every-
thing that might strike a court as unethical conduct or sharp
dealing.... The frequently quoted suggestion... that whatever
is not a 'reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental hon-
esty, fair play and right dealing in the general and business life
of members of society' is fraud cannot have been intended and
must not be taken literally. It is much too broad .... "I
Thus, the Seventh Circuit was concerned that a "scheme to defraud"
should not be defined so vaguely as to encompass whatever a court might
conclude constituted unethical or immoral conduct.
The Eighth Circuit has also considered the problem of whether a
defendant's conduct was sufficient to constitute a "scheme to defraud" in
United States v. McNeive,351 a case which illustrates the difficulty result-
ing from the lack of clear delineation under the statute.3"2 At trial,
McNeive was convicted of mail fraud for accepting five dollar gratuities
for the issuance of state plumbing contracts.353 Preliminarily, the Eighth
349. See, eg., United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 828 F.2d 21 (7th Cir.),
vacated, 108 S. Ct. 53 (1987), on remand, 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 108 S. Ct.
2022 (1988); United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838 (1985).
350. Holzer, 816 F.2d at 309. Holzer involved a state court judge who systematically asked
lawyers representing plaintiffs before him for "personal loans." Id. at 305. The court found
that "[a] public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the
litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately conceals material information from
them he is guilty of fraud." Id. at 307. Accordingly, in spite of the court's strong language
criticizing the broad view that the Fifth Circuit took of proscribed behavior under the mail
fraud statute, the Holzer court ultimately concluded that the judge's conduct did constitute a
"scheme to defraud." Id. at 309. As a consequence of the McNally decision, Judge Holzer
was released. He had been serving an 18 year sentence. Holzer, 840 F.2d at 1349. See infra
note 506 for a discussion of the effect of McNally on Holzer's case.
351. 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976).
352. Id. at 1251.
353. Id. at 1246. McNeive was the Chief Plumbing Inspector for the City of St. Louis. Id.
Among his duties was the issuance of plumbing permits to various contractors. Id. One con-
tracting company "had long indulged in the practice of sending its plumbing permit applica-
tions accompanied with two checks - one payable to the City of St. Louis for the proper permit
fee and a second one, payable to cash, for $5 for each permit application." Id. The defendant
was charged with ten counts of mail fraud. His acceptance of each five dollar gratuity was
characterized by the government as "a scheme.., to defraud the City of St. Louis and its
citizens of their right to the honest, faithful, and lawful decisions and actions in the perform-
ance of [a public] official['s] duties ... and of their right to have the City's business and its
affairs conducted honestly .... ." Id. at 1247.
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Circuit acknowledged the viability of the intangible rights doctrine.3" 4
However, the court was reluctant to extend the statute beyond what it
believed was Congress' intent.35 5 The court ultimately decided that
McNeive's conduct did not amount to a cognizable scheme to defraud.
The court's conclusion was based on the fact that McNeive never devi-
ated from strictly enforcing the plumbing code, never concealed his re-
ceipt of these "tips," and never believed that his acceptance of the tips
was illegitimate.356 In essence, McNeive had no intent to defraud, nor
could McNeive be said to have accepted a bribe. The court viewed his
conduct as essentially trivial; at worst, he had committed a
misdemeanor.3 5 7
The Eighth Circuit reversed McNeive's conviction, stating:
While we sympathize with the zealous prosecutor's view in this
case that tipping has no place in the administration and opera-
tion of a governmental agency, this does not transform the
practice into a mail fraud violation, nor does it give the prose-
cutors a license to inject themselves into local affairs to attempt
to rectify the problem. To permit the Government to do so in
this case would effect a further extension of [the mail fraud stat-
ute] so as to cover all actions which might offend the Govern-
ment's sense of personal propriety. This we refuse to do,
particularly since our acceptance of the Government's theory in
this case would have far-reaching ramifications as to the reach
of the already pervasive mail fraud statute. 58
Thus, the Eighth Circuit refused to extend the mail fraud statute to en-
compass such a minor infraction, even though the conduct arguably
could be said to conflict with accepted moral conduct.
While the McNeive court did not hold that the defendant's conduct
constituted mail fraud,- it is possible that another circuit might have up-
354. Id. at 1249.
355. Id. at 1247 n.3.
356. Id. at 1252.
357. Id. The court considered McNeive's conduct a "minor peculation." There was the
possibility that the acceptance of these gratuities amounted to a violation of a city ordinance
that prohibited the acceptance by city officials of "any payment or gift of money... for any
service performed in his official capacity." Id. at 1246.
358. Id. at 1252 The McNeive court questioned making "a federal case" out of this matter,
stating:
Why the Government would reach out to prosecute this type of case in federal court
is an enigma.... While we do not wish to impinge upon the sanctity of prosecutorial
discretion, it seems that the Government's vast prosecutorial and investigative re-
sources would be far better occupied if petty cases such as these were left to the
province of state legal, or even political, processes.
Id. at n.13.
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held McNeive's conviction. If the words of the Fifth Circuit regarding
"conduct which fails to match" moral uprightness" 9 had been literally
construed by the Eighth Circuit, McNeive might have been found guilty
of mail fraud. This result would arguably have constituted an undue
extension of the statute, considering McNeive had no intent to defraud;
he in fact considered his behavior legitimate.3" The fact that such a
result was entirely possible under some courts' broad application of the
mail fraud statute may have been one reason for the McNally Court's
narrow reading of the statute. Had McNeive's conviction been upheld, it
is arguable that the statute would have criminalized "a broad range of
apparently innocent conduct." '' This would have violated the principle
that a criminal statute must give fair notice that specific conduct is
forbidden.362
2. Federalism concerns
Still another concern that may have caused the McNally Court to
narrow the scope of the mail fraud statute involves principles of federal-
ism.363 As discussed above, the Court will harshly construe a criminal
statute only when Congress has clearly intended such a reading.3" The
359. See Blachly, 380 F.2d at 671; Gregory, 253 F.2d at 109.
360. A conviction under the mail fraud statute requires proof of a specific intent to defraud.
See United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915
(1982); United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978). See generally Note, A Survey of the Mail Fraud Act, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 673, 677-
78 (1978). Thus, McNeive's good faith may have been a defense to the charges of mail fraud.
See United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1982) (good faith is defense to charges
of mail fraud). However, specific intent to defraud may be proven by the scheme to defraud
and may be inferred from other facts. See United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572, 581
(5th Cir. 1988). Arguably, the prosecution still may have proven that McNeive had the requi-
site intent to defraud based on the fact that, although McNeive never affirmatively concealed
receipt of the tips, he never revealed his receipt of the tips either. See United States v. Von
Barta, 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981) (failure to disclose mate-
rial information and breach of fiduciary duty constitutes mail fraud); United States v. George,
477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973) (mail fraud violation for failure of
employee to provide honest and faithful services even though employee provided no preferen-
tial treatment in exchange for kickback).
361. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426; see also Williams, 458 U.S. at 286.
362. Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)
(Holmes, .)); see also Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162; Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
363. Federalism is a mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an
overreaching political system in such a way as to allow each to maintain its own fundamental
political integrity. 7 ENCYC. BRrr. MAc. 202 (1982). The Court will not want to upset this
system of political integrity between the states and the federal government, unless that is the
manifest intent of Congress. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 349; see also Rewis v. United States, 401
U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (Court will not be quick to assume Congress meant to effect significant
change in sensitive relation between federal-state criminal jurisdiction).
364. See supra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
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Court has followed the rule of lenity365 in cases in which criminal stat-
utes were challenged for not giving adequate notice that "apparently in-
nocent conduct" was criminal.366 Similarly, the Court has employed the
lenity principle in cases where broad readings of criminal statutes would
have resulted in a substantial extension of federal police power.367
In United States v. Bass,368 for example, the Court refused to give a
broad interpretation to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act.369 In that case, the government argued that the Act proscribed pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon. 370 The Bass Court, however,
stated that the statute was ambiguous. 371 Traditionally, firearm posses-
sion had been a matter governed by the state.372 Consequently, the
Court held that before it would read the statute as proscribing firearm
possession by a convicted felon, the government would be required to
prove that the firearms involved had been possessed "in commerce," thus
bringing the matter within federal power.37 3 The Bass Court stated:
[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be
deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state bal-
ance. ... [W]e will not be quick to assume that Congress has
meant to effect a significant change in the sensitive relation be-
tween federal and state criminal jurisdiction. In traditionally
sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance,
the requirement of [a] clear statement [by Congress] assures
that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into
issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision....
[Here], the legislative history provides scanty basis for conclud-
365. The rule of lenity provides that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
should be resolved in favor of lenity." Rewis, 401 U.S. at 812; see also supra notes 332-38 and
accompanying text.
366. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426; see also Williams, 458 U.S. at 286. See supra notes 337-42
and accompanying text.
367. See, eg., United States v. Emmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973); Bass, 404 U.S. at 349; Rewls,
401 U.S. at 812.
368. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
369. Id. at 347 (citing 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202 (a)).
370. Id. at 338.
371. Id. at 346-47.
372. Id. at 339.
373. Id. at 347. The constitutionality of the statute was not in doubt in Bass. Earlier that
year, the Court had decided Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). Perez upheld Con-
gress' power to regulate "loan sharking" activities, in spite of arguments that, to do so, would
constitute an exercise of general police power. Id at 155. Thus, in Bass, the Court was not
concerned with whether Congress could regulate "mere possession of firearms," but whether
in fact Congress had intended to do so. Bass, 404 U.S. at 339 n.4. See generally Stern, The




ing that Congress faced these serious questions and meant to
affect the federal-state balance in the way now claimed by the
Government.374
Thus, the Bass Court held that when a broad interpretation of a statute
would affect the federal-state balance, the Court should opt for a more
lenient reading in the absence of clear Congressional intent.
The McNally Court did not explicitly state that it was concerned
that a broad reading of the mail fraud statute might affect the federal-
state balance. However, the Court stated that it refused to "choose the
harsher" reading because the statute involved "the Federal Government
in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and
state officials., 37 5 This comment suggests that the Court was concerned
with federalism, and thus tried to avoid federal intrusion into state af-
fairs. The Court implied that the states should be responsible for setting
"good government" standards for their officials. Further, the McNally
holding suggested that the Court believed it is not within the province of
the federal government to set "good government" standards unless Con-
gress unequivocally evidences such an intent.37 6
Additionally, the Court noted that the defendants had not violated
state law. The Court remarked that "if state law ... did not forbid a
state officer [to engage in a scheme as the defendants did] it would take a
much clearer indication than the mail fraud statute evidences to convince
us [that the defendants' conduct] defrauds the State and is forbidden
under federal law."'377 This language indicated that the Court requires a
clear statement by Congress before the Court holds that conduct by state
officials, which is not proscribed by the state itself, constitutes a federal
offense. This is consistent with the principle that, absent congressional
intent to the contrary, a federal statute should not legislate in a field
which the states have traditionally occupied.378
On several occasions at the circuit level, the intangible rights doc-
trine had been subjected to attack on the grounds that the doctrine con-
flicted with principles of federalism.379 This argument arose most
frequently in cases involving public officials who conducted a scheme to
defraud by failing to disclose material information, although state law
did not impose a duty to disclose.380 In United States v. Mandel,38 1 for
374. Bass, 404 U.S. at 349-50 (citations omitted).
375. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 2882 n.9.
378. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
379. See, eg., Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 124; Mandel, 591 U.S. at 1357; States, 488 U.S. at 767.
380. See, e.g., United States v. Rendini, 738 F.2d 530, 533 (1st Cir. 1984); Margiotta, 688
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example, the defendants argued that "there was no evidence that any
state or federal law was transgressed by any of the defendants in the
execution of any part of their so-called 'corrupt relationship,' or scheme
to defraud. ' 382 The defendants asserted that their prosecution was
brought primarily to insure that, in the future, the state would have more
adequate disclosure requirements. As a result, the defendants claimed
that the mail fraud statute was being used to aid the state in achieving a
"more republican and responsible form of government." ' Thus, the de-
fendants contended that the federal government was attempting to tell
the state what kind of disclosure laws it should adopt for public officials.
In addressing this contention, the Mandel court began with the
premise that the purpose of the mail fraud statute was to protect the
integrity of the post office.3 84 Based on this purpose, the court ultimately
rejected the argument that the use of the mail fraud statute constituted
an impermissible federal intrusion into the affairs of the state.385 Conse-
quently, "the fact that the alleged scheme to defraud involved matters
traditionally of state concern is not a defense to the prosecution.1 3 6 The
Mandel court and other circuits that considered this issue thus have eas-
ily dispensed with the federalism argument. 87 Perhaps their analyses
differed from the McNally Court's because the discussion by these courts
began with the one seminal mail fraud case ignored by the McNally
Court-Badders v. United States. 88
Badders, decided in 1916, was the first case in which the constitu-
tionality of the mail fraud statute was addressed. 3 9 The defendant con-
tended that the statute was unconstitutional, arguing that it was outside
the jurisdiction of Congress. 90 In response, Justice Holmes held:
The overt act of putting a letter into the postoffice of the United
States is a matter that Congress may regulate. Whatever the
F.2d at 124; Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1357; Keane, 522 F.2d at 544; see also Von Barta, 635 F.2d at
1007 (employee's duty to disclose material information to his employer need not be imposed by
state or federal statute).
381. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), petition for writ of error coram nobis granted, 672 F. Supp. 864
(D. Md. 1987).
382. Id. at 1357.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1358.
385. Id. at 1359.
386. Id.
387. See, eg., Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 124; Mandel, 591 U.S. at 1357; States, 488 U.S. at 767.
388. 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
389. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
390. Badders, 240 U.S. at 393.
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limits to its power, it may forbid any such acts done in further-
ance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy,
whether it can forbid the scheme or not. 
3 91
Thus, the Badders Court held that whether or not a particular act fell
within Congress' power to regulate, Congress had the power to regulate
the act once the mails were used to effectuate that act.
With this proposition as a starting point, the Mandel court consid-
ered the basic purpose and scope of the mail fraud statute. That purpose,
it stated, was to prevent "the post office from being used as an instrument
of crime."3 9 The court concluded that:
[I]t is clear that the regulation of the mail fraud statute is on
the misuse of the mails, control of which lies with Congress,
and not on the substance of the scheme to defraud. Even if the
substance of the scheme to defraud involves matters normally
within the purview of state control or regulation, once the mails
are utilized to effectuate the scheme, the federal government
has the right to prosecute the schemer under the mail fraud
statute.393
Consequently, it was not a defense to assert that the mail fraud statute
was being used to regulate conduct that would ordinarily fall under the
state's domain. 394 Although state law normally governed disclosure re-
quirements for public officials, the mail fraud statute did not impermissi-
bly intrude into the state's realm.395 The scheme involved use of the
mails, and the mail fraud statute could thus be used to prosecute the
scheme.
Congress clearly has the power to regulate the use of the mails.39 6
Consequently, the Badders Court held that when the mails are used, any
regulation pursuant to that power lies within the federal province.3 97
Further, it is not an issue that the proscribed conduct may traditionally
have been within the state's domain, and thus may have been a scheme
that the federal government could not otherwise have "forbidden." '398
Thus, Badders puts to rest any federalism concerns by holding that use of
the mails to effect a fraudulent scheme brings the scheme within the fed-
391. Id. (emphasis added).
392. Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1358 (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896)).
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1359.
395. Id. at 1359-62.
396. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 7.
397. Badders, 240 U.S. at 393.
398. Id.
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eral domain.399 In using Badders as the starting point for their analyses,
numerous circuit courts concluded that whether a defendant violated
state law was irrelevant to a mail fraud inquiry.'
3. Conclusion: vagueness and federalism
The Badders decision constituted much of the foundation for the
development of the intangible rights doctrine by addressing two crucial
issues."° First, as long as the mails are used, Congress may regulate an
act whether the act itself comes within Congress' regulatory power.4 2
Second, as long as the mails are used, Congress can forbid any acts done
in furtherance of a scheme it regards as contrary to public policy." 3 The
Badders decision contained no requirement that such a scheme deprive
one of money or property.4° A scheme whereby politicians falsify elec-
tion results, for example, is undoubtedly a scheme "contrary to public
policy." 5 Under the Badders decision, such a scheme is clearly within
the scope of the mail fraud statute. °6 There need be no clearer directive
from Congress.
The fact that the McNally Court ignored Badders indicates that the
Court knew it would face analytical problems in reconciling Badders
with McNally. The McNally decision narrowed the scope of the mail
fraud statute in a manner inconsistent with how the statute had been
399. Id; see also States, 488 F.2d at 767, wherein the court stated:
The focus of the [mail fraud] statute is upon the misuse of the Postal Service, not the
regulation of state affairs, and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate such
misuse of the mails.... There are no grounds for dismissing the indictment under the
principles of comity or the abstention doctrine or under any other principle of
federalism.
Id.
400. See, e.g., Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 124; Von Barta, 635 F.2d at 1007; Mandel, 591 F.2d
at 1362; United States v. Williams, 545 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1976); McNeive, 536 F.2d at 1247;
United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 646 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976);
Keane, 522 F.2d at 544; States, 488 F.2d at 767; United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 880
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972).




405. See, e.g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1153 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1085 (1984) (falsification of election results); States, 488 F.2d at 676 (fraudulent voter registra-
tions and applications for absentee ballots); United States v. Classic, 35 F. Supp. 457, 458
(E.D. La. 1940) (ballots altered to read in favor of successful candidate).
406. A scheme to falsify election results should fall within the mail fraud statute, since such
a scheme would "deprive an electoral body of its political rights to fair elections free from
dilution from the intentional casting and tabulation of false, fictitious or spurious ballots."
Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1153.
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interpreted for over 70 years.4°7 Prior to McNally, circuit courts had
"long interpreted the mail fraud statute... as proscribing schemes to
defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial govern-
ment."'1'8 These decisions were based on years of reasoned analysis by
learned judges giving careful consideration to legislative intent, judicial
precedent, and the language of the statute itself.'
As Justice Stevens said in his dissent in McNally:
I am at a loss to understand the source or justification for this
holding .... Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the Court's
action.., is its casual-almost summary-rejection of the ac-
cumulated wisdom of the many distinguished federal judges
who have thoughtfully considered and correctly answered the
question this case presents.... In the long run, it is not clear
how grave the ramifications of [this] decision will be. Congress
can, of course, negate it by amending the statute.... The pos-
sibilities that the decision's impact will be mitigated do not
moderate my conviction that the Court has made a serious mis-
take. Nor do they erase my lingering questions about why a
Court that has not been particularly receptive of the rights of
criminal defendants in recent years has acted so dramatically to
protect the elite class of powerful individuals who will benefit
from this decision.410
For years, federal prosecutors had relied on the mail fraud statute to
ferret out corruption in state government and ensure that citizens re-
tained their right to honest government. 41 1 The McNally decision dealt
them a devastating blow that now can only be corrected by Congress.
Moreover, the intangible rights doctrine did not suffer from vague-
ness and federalism problems to the degree that the Court perceived.412
Concededly, the standard for what kind of conduct constituted a scheme
to defraud was, as interpreted by some circuits,4 13 overly broad. Rather
than reject the entire doctrine, however, the Court could have redefined
407. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879.
408. United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1294 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. McNally v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
409. See cases cited supra note 5.
410. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2884, 2890-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
411. Id. at 2883 nn. 1-3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
412. Id. at 2881.
413. See Blachly, 380 F.2d at 671; see also Van Dyke, 605 F.2d at 225; Gregory, 253 F.2d at
109. See supra notes 343-50 and accompanying text.
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the standard so that its outer boundaries were not ambiguous.414 More-
over, the federalism concerns were answered more than 70 years earlier
in Badders, a case the McNally Court ignored.4 15 Thus, the Court had
no reason to apply the rule of lenity to the mail fraud statute, and inter-
pret the statute as applicable only to schemes involving money or
property.
VI. PROSECUTING PUBLIC CORRUPTION AFTER MCNALLY
V UNITED STATES
McNally v. United States41 6 immediately generated a great deal of
controversy. One article, entitled "Fallout from McNally,"' 4 11 summa-
rized some of the positions taken in the legal community:
[D]ebate over what legislative remedies, if any, should be
adopted is going strong in the Department of Justice and
among the defense bar.
The positions range from that of a Congressman who is
pushing to redefine fraud throughout the U.S. Code to include
defrauding of any intangible right or breach of virtually any
duty or contract, to that of a group of criminal defense lawyers
who applaud the Supreme Court decision and do not want
Congress to backtrack over a ruling that they believe has put
the brakes on years of unfounded expansion of mail fraud.418
Still others have commented that "[t]he practical impact of McNally on
future intangible-rights cases will probably be limited.' ' 419 The full ex-
tent of McNally's impact on intangible rights cases will, of course, take
years to develop. So far, no cohesive direction has emerged in the lower
courts. Circuit courts have adopted differing positions on how intangible
414. Admittedly, prohibiting a scheme "contrary to public policy" is a problematic stan-
dard, in that its perimeters are not clearly defined. However, as Justice Stevens remarked:
With no guidance from this Court, the Courts of Appeal have struggled to define just
when conduct which is clearly unethical is also criminal. In some instances, how-
ever, such as voting fraud cases, the criminality of the scheme and the fraudulent use
of the mails could not be clearer. It is sometimes difficult to define when there has
been a scheme to defraud someone of intangible rights. But it is also sometimes
difficult to decide when a tangible loss was caused by fraud. The fact that the exer-
cise of judgment is sometimes difficult is no excuse for rejecting an entire doctrine
that is both sound and faithful to the intent of Congress.
McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
415. Badders, 240 U.S. at 393.
416. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
417. Franklin, Fallout From McNally, N.Y.L.J., October 15, 1987, at 5, col. 2.
418. Id.
419. The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. RaV. 329, 335 (1987).
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rights cases will be prosecuted in the wake of McNally.42
The McNally Court offered some guidelines that suggest how future
intangible rights cases may be prosecuted. 21 Preliminarily, this section
examines those guidelines. Prosecutors arguing cases in the circuit
courts decided prior to the McNally decision under the now-defunct in-
tangible rights doctrine were, of course, unaware of the standards to
which they had to adhere.422 Following McNally, courts have reconsid-
ered some cases, have applied McNally retroactively, and have over-
turned convictions that were based on conduct now deemed outside the
scope of the mail fraud statute.423 In another line of cases, courts have
sustained convictions originally obtained under the intangible rights doc-
trine under an alternative rationale derived from principles of agency
law.424 This section discusses whether the intangible rights doctrine or
the "alternative rationale" is still tenable. Finally, the section explores
suggestions for legislative change.
A. Guidelines from McNally on Future Intangible Rights Prosecutions
The actual holding of McNally v. United States42 was that the de-
fendants' convictions had to be reversed because "the jury instruction on
the substantive mail fraud count permitted a conviction for conduct not
within the reach of [section] 1341. " 426 This holding derived from the
Court's decision that "[t]he mail fraud statute clearly protects property
rights, but does not refer to the intangible right of the citizenry to good
government. ' 427 The jury instructions were faulty because the jury had
not been charged, nor were they required to find that in order to convict,
the state itself had been defrauded of any money or property.428
Rather, the indictment charged James Gray and Charles McNally
with devising a scheme (1) to defraud the citizens of Kentucky "of their
420. See cases cited infra notes 423-24.
421. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2882.
422. See, eg., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th'Cir.) [Mandell], aff'd in rele-
vant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), petition for writ of
error coram nobis granted, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987) [Mandel 11]; Ingber v. Enzor, 664
F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd,
842 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 697 (1988).
423. See, eg., Mandel I, 672 F. Supp. at 875, Ingber, 664 F. Supp. at 822-23; United States
v. Slay, 673 F. Supp. 336, 349 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
424. See, e.g., Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1186; Fagan, 821 F.2d at 1010-11 & n.6.
425. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
426. Id. at 2882.
427. Id. at 2879.
428. Id. at 2882.
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right to have the Commonwealth's business and its affairs conducted
honestly, impartially, free from corruption, bias, dishonesty, deceit, offi-
cial misconduct, and fraud" and (2) "to obtain ... money and other
things of value, by means of false pretenses .... 429 The jury was in-
structed that a scheme to defraud could be proven by one of two sets of
findings.430 The first finding was that Howard Hunt had de facto control
over the awarding of insurance policies to Wombwell, and directed pay-
ments from Wombwell to Seton without disclosing his ownership interest
in Seton to other officials in state government.43 Under this finding,
Gray and McNally would have been aiders and abetters in the scheme.432
The second finding sufficient for a conviction alleged that Gray had su-
pervisory authority over the awarding of the state's insurance policies,
and that he concealed his ownership interest in Seton; McNally would
have been guilty as an aider and abetter under this finding.
433
The Court held that these instructions could not support a convic-
tion for mail fraud. The Court stated:
[T]here was no charge and the jury was not required to find
that the Commonwealth itself was defrauded of any money or
property. It was not charged that in the absence of the alleged
scheme the Commonwealth would have paid a lower premium
or secured better insurance. Hunt and Gray received part of
the commissions but those commissions were not the Common-
429. Id. at 2878 n.4. Although the instructions were given in the conjunctive, the Court
implied that the jury could convict if it found that either of these two elements were satisfied.
Id. at 2882. See infra text accompanying notes 474-75 for discussion of conjunctive and dis-
junctive jury instructions.
430. Id. at 2878-79.
431. Id. at 2879. Howard Hunt was not an elected official; rather, he occupied the ap-
pointed position of Chairman of the Democratic Party. See supra text accompanying note 91.
In United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913
(1983), the court considered whether "an individual who occupies no official public office but
nonetheless participates substantially in the operation of government" could be held to owe a
duty to the general citizenry, sufficient to support a charge that he violated their intangible
rights. Id. at 121. The court used a "de facto control test," under which a person who makes
government decisions in fact may be held to be a fiduciary of the general citizenry. Id. at 122.
In Margiotta, the jury had to find that the "work done by [Margiotta] was in substantial part
the business of Government... and that the performance of that work was intended by him
and relied on by others in Government as part of the business of Government in order to carry
forward its affairs as a whole." Id. at 126. The Margiotta court found the defacto control test
satisfied, and affirmed Margiotta's mail fraud convictions. Id. at 128. As Hunt was also not an
elected official, the government's theory under this finding was premised on the determination
that Hunt had de facto control over the business of government. See generally Note, Mail
Fraud and the De Facto Public Offcia" The Second Circuit Protects Citizens' Rights to Honest
Government, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 933 (1983).
432. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2878-79.
433. Id. at 2879.
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wealth's money. Nor was the jury charged that to convict it
must find that the Commonwealth was deprived of control over
how its money was spent.434
Thus, under the majority's reasoning, neither finding was sufficient to
support a conviction under the mail fraud statute, as neither required the
jury to find that someone had lost money or property as a result of the
defendants' conduct.
The Court's holding that the jury instructions were insufficient to
support a mail fraud conviction provides a clear lesson for the prosecu-
tion of future intangible rights cases. An indictment cannot simply allege
that the state's citizens have been deprived of their right to honest gov-
ernment. Nor can an indictment allege that a scheme to defraud consists
of both depriving citizens of the right to honest government and "ob-
tain[ing] ... money and other things of value. ' 4 35 Instead, the indict-
ment must specifically allege that a victim has been deprived of money or
property. Accordingly, jury instructions must charge that a scheme to
defraud is proven only if the prosecution has proved a loss of money or
property.436 The Court offered a blueprint for prosecutors to follow-
prosecutors should allege that the state lost money by paying insurance
premiums at too high a price, or the "kickbacks" were money that might
have gone to the state, or the state was deprived of control over how its
money was spent.
If McNally is viewed simply as a directive that, in mail fraud cases,
jury instructions must allege that the defendants caused a loss of money
or property, then the intangible rights doctrine might not be entirely
dead. The cure to revive the doctrine appears to be relatively simple-
prosecutors must prove money or property loss. One article has sug-
gested that "imaginative prosecutorial and judicial theories might resus-
citate the existing mail fraud statute by demonstrating a loss of property
or money in cases that would formerly have been brought under the in-
tangible-rights theory.
'4 37
However, the cure to resuscitate the doctrine is not that simple; it is,
in fact, problematic in two respects. First, proof of property loss may not
be available. In McNally, for example, the Court suggested that the gov-
ernment prove that, absent the scheme, the state would have paid lower
434. Id. at 2882.
435. Id. at 2878. The jury instructions were faulty, as a conviction could have been based
on either finding a deprivation of the right to honest government or obtaining money or prop-
erty. The instructions did not require a finding of money or property loss. Id. at 2882.
436. Id. at 2882.
437. The Supreme Court, supra note 419, at 335-36.
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premiums."' Under this guideline, the government would be required to
adduce post hoe declarations by other insurance companies that they
would have charged the state less money for identical policies. Admit-
tedly, this might make the government's job more difficult, but such ad-
missions conceivably could be introduced. In other types of cases,
however, such as election fraud439 or bribery of a judicial official, proof of
property loss is likely impossible.' 0 These kinds of cases may not be
"salvageable" under the mail fraud statute, in spite of the McNally
Court's directives for proper jury instructions.
The second problem with the proposed "cure" for the mail fraud
statute is the suggestion that "imaginative prosecutorial and judicial the-
ories" can be used to demonstrate proof of property loss in cases which
might previously have been brought under the intangible rights doc-
trine.4" The inference from this suggestion is that fraudulent conduct
might be dismissed simply because of the lack of creativity of a govern-
ment attorney in construing an offense to fit within the mail fraud frame-
work. "Imaginative theories" should not be substituted for sound legal
reasoning. Lack of creativity on the part of prosecutors has undoubtedly
been responsible for the dismissal of cases in other areas of the law." 2
438. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2882.
439. See United States v. Crispen, 672 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("The mail
fraud statute in all probability can no longer serve as the basis for election fraud prosecu-
tions.").
In United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1982), Judge Garwood's concurring
opinion suggested that "absentee ballots for the fictitious persons" in an election fraud scheme
could be construed as the "tangible items" necessary to satisfy a money or property require-
ment in the mail fraud statute. Id. at 420 (concurring opinion). Whether this contention
could survive judicial scrutiny has not been resolved. In Ingber v. Enzor, 664 F. Supp. 814
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), the government argued that a successful election fraud scheme, whereby one
was elected based on fraudulent ballots, should be cognizable under the statute even after
McNally. Id. at 820. The theory was premised on finding that the elected official defrauded
the citizens of money or property by paying him a salary that he would not have received but
for the fraudulent ballots. Id. The court, however, found that the salary would have been paid
to another "victorious candidate," and thus no money was lost as a result of the scheme. Id. at
822. See infra notes 467-78 and accompanying text for discussion of Ingber.
440. See United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 828 F.2d 21 (7th Cir.),
vacated, 108 S. Ct. 53 (1987), on remand, 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2022 (1988). Holzer involved the prosecution of a judge who accepted bribes from the attor-
neys with cases pending before him. In a pre-McNally opinion, the court stated:
It is irrelevant that, so far as it appears, Holzer never ruled differently in a case
because of a lawyer's willingness or unwillingness to make him a loan, so that his
conduct caused no demonstrable loss either to a litigant or the public at large. How
can anyone prove how a judge would have ruled if he had not been bribed?
Id. at 308 (citations omitted). See also Chi. Daily L. Bull., July 1, 1987, at 1, col. 3-4 (charges
dropped against circuit judge for accepting bribes to fix drunk driving cases).
441. The Supreme Court, supra note 419, at 335-36.
442. Arguably this dilemma affects many areas of jurisprudence, but such an analysis is
November 1988] PROSECUTING PUBLIC CORRUPTION
Nevertheless, it is disturbing to construe McNally as a directive from the
Court, instructing prosecutors to invent "imaginative" theories to some-
how "save" their cases.
Imaginative theories have been used by government attorneys, how-
ever, and the McNally Court's suggestion concerning proper jury instruc-
tions allowed some cases to be "saved" by alleging property loss.' 4 On
the other hand, not all cases that were decided prior to McNally sur-
vived. 4 In many instances, the cases that did not survive were partially
based on the loss of the citizens' right to honest government or an entity's
intangible right to "accurate information.""'  Some courts have held
that claims based on these kinds of activities are no longer cognizable
under the statute after McNally. Under this reasoning, some courts have
applied McNally retroactively." 6
B. Aftermath of McNally: Retroactive Holdings
Following the Court's mandate in McNally that a scheme to defraud
must include a loss of money or property," 7 several defendants prose-
cuted under the intangible rights doctrine sought review." 8 In some of
these cases, the jury had been instructed that a scheme to defraud could
be based on a finding that the defendants had defrauded citizens "of their
beyond the scope of this Note. However, the point was aptly illustrated by one defendant
seeking to have his intangible rights conviction vacated. See United States v. Keane, 678 F.
Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1987) [Keane I], aff'd, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988). The government
argued that Keane could still be guilty of mail fraud under the laws of agency. Id. at 711. The
defendant replied that the government had submitted a "generic brief that would magically
transform all intangible rights into the Supreme Court's notion of substantial property." Id.
See infra notes 487-530 and accompanying text for a discussion of Keane II and cases adopting
the government's agency theory.
443. See, e.g., id. at 712; Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1186; Fagan, 821 F.2d at 1010-11 & n.6;
Crispen, 672 F. Supp. at 1101.
444. See, eg., United States v. Gimbel, 632 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Wis. 1985), [Gimbel I],
rev'd, 830 F. 2d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 1987) [Gimbel II]; Slay, 673 F. Supp. at 348-49; Mandel II,
672 F. Supp. at 875-76.
445. See, e.g., Gimbel II, 830 F.2d at 623 (accurate information); Slay, 673 F. Supp. at 338-
39 (right to honest government); Mandel I, 672 F. Supp. at 868 (right to honest government).
446. See cases cited infra note 448.
447. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1987).
448. United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.) [Holzer I], rev'd, 828 F.2d 21 (7th Cir.
1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 53, on remand; 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.) [Holzer II], cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2022 (1988); United States v. Gimbel, 632 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Wis. 1985) [Gimbel
I], rev'd, 830 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1987) [Gimbel II]; United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347
(4th Cir.) [Mandel I], aff'd in relevant parM 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445
U.S. 961 (1980), petition for writ of error coram nobis granted, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987)
[Mandel 11]; United States v. Slay, 673 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Ingber v. Enzor, No.
86-1402 (S.D.N.Y. February 4, 1987), petition for writ of habeas corpus granted, 664 F. Supp.
814 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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right to the conscientious, loyal, faithful, disinterested and unbiased serv-
ices, actions and performance of official duties . . . free from bribery,
corruption, partiality, willful omission, bias, dishonesty, deceit, official
misconduct and fraud." 49 Because McNally held that similar instruc-
tions permitted conviction for conduct that was not within the reach of
the mail fraud statute,450 the question courts subsequent to McNally
confronted on review was whether McNally would have retroactive effect
on cases in which a defendant had been convicted under this impermissi-
ble type of jury instruction.
One of the first cases decided involving the retroactivity issue was
United States v. Mandel.51 Mandel was Governor of Maryland when he
was convicted under the mail fraud statute for defrauding citizens of
their right to honest government.4 2 Specifically, Mandel was found to
have concealed his interest in the Maryland horse racing industry while
legislation affecting that industry was pending.45 3 The jury found him
guilty of fifteen counts of mail fraud and one count of racketeering; the
court sentenced him to four years in prison.45 4 Mandel had already
served nineteen months of that sentence with the remainder commuted
by the time McNally was decided. 5 Consequently, he sought to have
his conviction vacated under a writ of error coram nobis.45 6
Preliminarily, the Mandel court noted that this writ is available
when one is convicted and punished for actions that are not considered
criminal.457 The court then discussed the holding of McNally and con-
cluded that "it is indisputably settled that the federal mail fraud statute
does not now make criminal, nor has it ever made criminal, the use of the
mails in furtherance of schemes or artifices to defraud persons of non-
449. Mandel II, 672 F. Supp. at 868; see also Slay, 673 F. Supp. at 338.
450. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2882.
451. Mandel II, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987).
452. Mandell, 591 F.2d at 1386.
453. Id. at 1354-57.
454. Id. at 1352.
455. Mandel II, 672 F. Supp. at 871.
456. Id. at 866. The writ of error coram nobis comes from common law; its purpose is
'[t]o relieve litigants from judicial wrongs for which there was no remedy .... '" Id. (citing
Annotation, Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 38 A.L.R. FED. 617, 622 (1978)). In United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), the Court held that the writ would only be available if an error
of the "most fundamental character" had occurred, and there was no other remedy available.
Id. at 512. "Where a prisoner has fully served his prison term for a felony conviction, a writ of
error coram nobis may issue because, "[a]lthough the term has been served, the results of the
conviction may persist." Mandel I, 672 F. Supp. at 867 (quoting United States v. Morgan,
346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954)).
457. Id. (quoting United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171, 1176 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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property rights. '458 Applying this holding to the facts of Mandel, the
court stated:
[Ilt is clear that intangible rights to good and honest govern-
ment may not be the target of a criminal scheme to defraud
under the federal mail fraud statute .... It is similarly clear
that the jury charge in Mandel permitted conviction for mail
fraud premised on a deprivation of intangible rights, i.e., the
right of a state's citizens to honest and faithful government, ex-
plicitly disapproved in McNally .... Petitioner[] thus [was]
convicted of using the mails to defraud citizens and public offi-
cials of intangible, non-monetary rights-conduct which has
never been made criminal by federal statute. This Court, then,
has no choice but to grant a writ of error coram nobis .... "I
Therefore, the court vacated Mandel's conviction, concluding that Mc-
Nally was to be applied retroactively.4' °
Other courts also reasoned that pre-McNally intangible rights con-
victions could no longer stand if the jury had not been required to find a
loss of money or property.461 In United States v. Gimbel,46 2 the Seventh
Circuit considered reversing a mail fraud conviction for a money laun-
dering and tax fraud scheme.463 Gimbel was originally convicted under
the theory that his activity constituted a scheme to defraud the Treasury
Department of its right to "accurate and truthful" tax assessment
data.4' 4 On appeal, the government argued that by concealing the infor-
mation, Gimbel had, in effect, deprived the Treasury of tax revenues. The
Seventh Circuit, however, found that "the jury was not required to find
that the scheme resulted in the government being deprived of money or
property. '465 The court concluded that the indictment had not stated an
offense under the mail fraud statute. Consequently, Gimbel's conviction
was reversed.46
Finally, Ingber v. Enzor467 concerned a petition to vacate the con-
viction of a defendant indicted under an election fraud scheme.468 The
458. Id. at 873.
459. Id. at 875-76.
460. Id. at 876.
461. See, e.g., United States v. Herron, 825 F.2d 50, 58 (5th Cir. 1987); Slay, 673 F. Supp.
at 349; Ingber, 664 F. Supp. at 821.
462. Gimbel II, 830 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1987).
463. Id. at 622.
464. Id. at 626.
465. Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
466. Id.
467. 664 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
468. Id. at 815.
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indictment alleged that the defendant had defrauded the citizens of Fall-
sburg, New York of" 'their ballots and of their right to a fair and impar-
tial electoral process' essentially by falsifying voting documents,
including voter registration forms, applications for absentee ballots, and
absentee ballots which were then cast in [defendant's] favor... "469 The
indictment also charged the defendant "with obtaining the 'salary, pow-
ers and privileges' of the office of Supervisor."470 The court found that a
scheme to deprive voters of their right to honest elections was not within
the reach of the mail fraud statute as defined by McNally, because the
scheme did not deprive the voters of anything tangible.471
The Ingber court noted that the jury had been instructed to find
"that the fraud had either one of two purposes: (1) to defraud the public
of the intangible right to honest elections, or (2) to obtain 'money or
property,-specifically, the salary-powers and privileges of the Office of
Supervisor .... "'47 These instructions were similar to those given in
McNally;473 the Ingber indictment had alleged fraud based on either de-
priving the citizens of their right to honest government, or obtaining
money or property by means of false pretenses. As with McNally, the
Ingber court reasoned that the possibility that the jury verdict was based
on the "money or property" finding necessitated reversing the
conviction.474
The Ingber court stated two reasons why the conviction could not
stand. First, the court noted that there were doubts as to whether the
conviction was predicated upon permissible or impermissible grounds,
and that doubt must be resolved in the defendant's favor.475 Second, the
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 820.
472. Id.
473. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2878 n.4.
474. Ingber, 664 F. Supp. at 820-21. Slay also involved a dual jury instruction, whereby a
icheme to defraud could be found on either premise. Slay, 673 F. Supp. at 339. The court
noted that it was "far from certain that the jury rested its actual decision on a finding that
defendants intended to devise a scheme to obtain money or other property ..... " Id. at 348.
As it was impossible to tell which ground the jury selected, the court held that the verdicts
must be set aside. Id. at 348-49.
475. Ingber, 664 F. Supp. at 821. The jury instructions in Mandel I also contained a dual
charge to the jury-that a scheme to defraud could be found by finding that Mandel deprived
the citizens of Maryland of their right to honest government and that he sought to obtain
money by false pretenses. Mandell, 591 F.2d at 1353. This time, the instructions were given
in the conjunctive. In addressing the jury instruction, the Mandel II court noted:
Applying the well-settled principle that instructions must be viewed as a whole,
rather than in isolated sentences, [the second instruction] does not alter the fact that
the instructions as a whole permitted mail fraud convictions to be entered without a
finding that any person was deprived of a property right.
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court reasoned that, even if the jury had found that the scheme was based
on fraudulently obtaining a salary, "the jury was not required to find,
that in the absence of the election tampering, the Town of Fallsburg
would not have incurred the expense of the Supervisor's salary."476 Em-
ploying the McNally reasoning that the insurance commissions would
have been paid to someone even in the absence of the defendants' kick-
back scheme, the Ingber court stated that the defendant's salary would
have been paid "to some victorious candidate," regardless of the defend-
ant's scheme.477 Consequently, the court held that McNally applied ret-
roactively and vacated Ingber's conviction.478
These cases demonstrate that McNally has retroactive effect when a
conviction was based on a jury finding that the scheme to defraud in-
volved either a deprivation of intangible rights or a scheme to obtain
money or property, but the jury was not required to find a loss of money
or property.479 Without a requirement of money or property loss, a jury
may have convicted based solely on the deprivation of intangible rights.
Thus, the cases applying McNally retroactively reasoned that retroactiv-
ity is necessary, following from the principle that "criminal conduct does
not offend against the federal government unless it violates an Act of
Congress."48 0 According to this principle, the judiciary cannot enlarge
the reach of federal crimes and criminalize that which Congress did not
intend to be criminal.48' Therefore, if a deprivation of intangible rights
was never intended by Congress to constitute a federal crime under the
MandelII, 672 F. Supp. at 875 n.8 (citations omitted). In spite of the fact that the instructions
were in the conjunctive, the court nonetheless considered that "[t]he charge given here did not
require... [proof] that the citizens of Maryland... suffered any economic loss or injury as a
result of [Mandel's] conduct." Id. at 875 (emphasis in original).
476. Ingber, 664 F. Supp. at 822.
477. Id. (emphasis in original).
478. Id. at 822-23.
479. Although these courts reasoned that they were legally required to vacate the defend-
ants' convictions, some courts were clearly not pleased that such a decision was compelled. In
Slay, the court stated:
The viewpoint of this Court (which, of course, is of no consequence in view of Mc-
Nally) is expressed by Justice Stevens in his dissent: "Perhaps the most distressing
aspect of the Court's action today is its casual-almost summary-rejection of the
accumulated wisdom of the many distinguished federal judges who have thoughtfully
considered and correctly answered the question this case presents."
Slay, 673 F. Supp. at 352 n.8 (quoting McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2890 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also Mandel II, 672 F. Supp. at 878-79, quoted infra note 579.
But see Ingber, 664 F. Supp. at 824. In Ingber, the court stated that: "[t]he explosion of
intangible rights prosecutions in the last ten years constitutes an inconsistent blip on a century-
long lifeline of mail fraud prosecutions of wicked city-dwellers who fleece their more gullible
countrymen of tangible goods and property." Id.
480. Mandel II, 672 F. Supp. at 873.
481. Id. (citing Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 241 (1943); United States v. Stan-
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mail fraud statute, the circuit courts were not empowered to base a con-
viction on such conduct.482 As the Mandel court noted, "'t]he unam-
biguous words of a statute which imposes criminal penalties are not to be
altered by judicial construction so as to punish one not otherwise within
its reach, however deserving his conduct may seem.' 483
C. Aftermath of McNally-Sustained Convictions
Courts sustaining convictions following McNally v. United States,484
have relied on two different theories. First, some courts have adopted an
agency theory, using principles of agency law to find the required loss of
money or property. 85 Second, other courts have found that, even
though the jury was not instructed to find a loss of money or property,
such a finding was implicit in the jury's verdict.
486
1. The agency theory
Although many courts have held that McNally must be applied ret-
roactively, other courts have avoided vacating convictions using princi-
ples derived from agency law.4" 7 As applied in the mail fraud context,
the agency theory states that when an agent appropriates an economic
benefit that should properly be the principal's, the elements of mail fraud
as dictated by McNally are satisfied.488 This theory derives from the con-
cept that, if an agent violates his duty to the principal, he is liable to the
principal for proceeds received from the violation.489 The agency theory
has been invoked in cases involving kickback schemes where employees
were found to have defrauded employers of their right to honest serv-
ices.49 Arguably, the theory could extend to public officials as well, and
might "magically transform"4 91 most intangible rights cases to fit within
dard Brewery, Inc., 251 U.S. 210, 219-20 (1920); United States v. George, 228 U.S. 14, 20-22
(1913); Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 453-62 (1908)).
482. Id.
483. Id. at 874 (quoting Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 243 (1943)).
484. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1982).
485. See cases cited infra note 487.
486. See cases cited infra note 510.
487. See United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 842 F.2d 909 (6th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 697
(1988). But see United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1988) [Holzer II], discussed
infra at note 506.
488. Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1186.
489. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2890 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
490. See Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1186; Fagan, 821 F.2d at 1005.
491. See Keane I, 678 F. Supp. at 711 (government's generic brief describing services of
public employee as a property right would "magically transform" all intangible rights cases
into Supreme Court's notion of property).
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McNally's definition of money or property lOSS. 492
The Sixth Circuit used the agency concept in United States v. Run-
nels.493 Runnels involved a kickback scheme in which a union official
accepted bribes.49 4 The court reasoned that since Runnels was an agent
of the union, the payments that Runnels received did not belong to him;
rather they belonged to the union.49 5 Accordingly, the court held that an
agent had appropriated "an economic benefit that properly should be the
principal's."4 96 Under this theory, the agent had deprived the principal
of money or property. Thus, the elements of mail fraud under McNally
were satisfied.
492. Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1186 n.2.
493. Id. at 1186. Fagan also applied the agency principle to an employee kickback scheme.
Fagan, 821 F.2d at 1005. Fagan cited support for the theory from Justice Stevens' dissent in
McNally:
"[I]f an agent receives anything as a result of his violation of a duty of loyalty to the
principal, he is subject to a liability to deliver it, its value, or its proceeds, to the
principal."... This duty may fulfill the Court's "money or property" requirement in
most kickback schemes.
Fagan, 821 F.2d at 1011 n.6 (citing McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2890 n.10
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (1987) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 408 (1958))).
Additionally, Fagan held that the economic requirement was also satisfied by the em-
ployee's misappropriation of the information that the supplier would have accepted less for the
goods. Id. at 1009. If the supplier was willing to kick back some of its profits to the employee,
then the employer would have known that the supplier might have been willing to accept less
money. "This possibility clearly had some economic value." Id.
494. Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1184. In Runnels, Frank Runnels, a union president, and Arnold
Shapero, an attorney, appealed their convictions for defrauding the union of its right to honest
services and representation. Id. A jury had found that the defendants had contrived a bribery
scheme, in which Runnels agreed to take money from Shapero in exchange for referring union
members to Shapero's firm. Id. at 1184-85. The court reasoned that Runnels had a fiduciary
duty to the union. As a fiduciary, the court noted that Runnels had a duty to "account to the
organization for any profit received... in whatever capacity in connection with transactions
conducted by him ... on behalf ofthe organization." Id. at 1186 (quoting the Labor Manage-
ment Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 501(a)).
495. Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1187. The court stated that "the benefit properly belongs to the
entity to whom the fiduciary has a duty." Id.
496. Id. at 1186. The Runnels court unequivocally stated that the same reasoning could
apply to public officials. Id. at 1187. According to the court, "the fiduciary duties of public
officials is equally well established." Id. at 1186 n.2. Specifically, the court stated that a public
official is an agent of the county or state, which is the principal. The court reasoned that any
bribes acquired by an official in his official capacity would belong to the state, under the theory
that the official has merely held the money in constructive trust for the government. Id. at
1187-88. The court recognized that this theory would not be applicable to intangible rights
cases that did not involve the receipt of some kickback or bribe, as the requisite economic
benefit would be absent. Id. at 1188.
Additionally, the court stated that "it has been repeatedly held.., that public officials
and employees serving interests in conflict with those of the United States for their own gain
hold the funds they receive, no matter what the source, in constructive trust for the govern-
ment." Id. at 1188 (quoting United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978)).
The constructive trust theory was also argued by the government in Mandeli. United
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After finding that the agency or "benefit deprivation" theory pro-
vided the necessary deprivation of money or property required under
McNally, the Runnels court confronted a second obstacle before it af-
firmed the convictions. At trial, the jury had been instructed only under
an intangible rights theory.4 9 7 The Runnels court, however, did not con-
sider this to be reversible error. The court noted that "appellate courts
have affirmed convictions based on an erroneous instruction where the
jury's verdict necessarily demonstrates that it found against the defend-
ants on all the facts necessary to convict on a proper theory or instruc-
tion which was also before the jury."4 9 8
In Runnels, however, the "proper theory"-the agency theory-was
not actually before the jury. The court noted that they were "aware of
the dangers of affirming a criminal conviction on a theory not properly
advanced at trial."4 9 9 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that it was justi-
fied in affirming the conviction in this case because the jury had necessar-
ily found every fact essential to support the mail fraud count.s°" This
determination derived from the court's assessment that a defendant can
be convicted under an intangible rights theory by a finding that the de-
fendant has been suborned.5 0 1 Applying that finding to the facts of Run-
nels, the court stated:
The jury could only have found Runnels guilty under the intan-
gible rights doctrine by concluding that Runnels, though a fidu-
ciary of [the union], had accepted payments from Shapero....
These payments were the only method of subornation
presented at the trial. Thus, it is inescapable that the jury con-
cluded that Runnels accepted payments. . . . If Runnels ac-
cepted the payments, as the jury necessarily concluded, then he
took money which belonged to [the union] as a matter of law,
and violated the mail fraud statute under either the intangible
rights doctrine or under the benefit deprivation analysis.502
States v. Mandel, 672 F. Supp. 864, 877 (D. Md. 1987). The court refused to consider this
theory as it was never presented to the jury. Id. at 878.
The theory was argued in Holzer II, 840 F.2d at 1347 and soundly rejected by the court.
See infra text accompanying note 506 for discussion of Holzer.
497. Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1188.
498. Id. at 1189.
499. Id. at 1191.
500. Id. at 1189. "There is no prejudice... when, in order for the jury to find an essential
element of crime based on the erroneous instruction, it must necessarily have found every fact
essential to support a finding of the same element based on the alternative, correct charge
... ." Id. (quoting United States v. H & M, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 651, 660 (M.D. Pa. 1983)).
501. Id. at 1191.
502. Id. at 1192. It is not necessarily true that the jury must have "inescapably" concluded
[V/ol. 22:325
November 1988] PROSECUTING PUBLIC CORRUPTION
Accordingly, the court found that there was no uncertainty that the jury
had found every fact necessary to support a conviction under the benefit
deprivation theory. The court, therefore, amrmed Runnels' conviction.
5 0 3
The Runnels court distinguished McNally by noting that, in Mc-
Nally, the Court stated that the insurance proceeds would have been paid
to some other agency, if not to Wombwell. 5 4 "Thus, the money Mc-
Nally kept was not owned by Kentucky once it was paid to the insurance
agency."' 505 In contrast, the bribes Runnels kept were owned by the
union. The court stated that, absent the kickback scheme, Runnels
would not have received the bribe money. Thus, the court reasoned, the
bribes that Runnels received were monies held in constructive trust for
the union.5°6
The distinction the Runnels court drew with McNally, however, ig-
nores the Runnels court's own agency theory. Applying the reasoning of
the agency theory to the facts in McNally, Hunt and Gray were arguably
fiduciaries of the government.50 7 Consequently, as agents of the state,
any bribes that they took belonged to the state as principal.50 8 Under
that Runnels actually accepted payments. For example, the jury may have found that Runnels
deprived the union of its intangible right to honest services by the fact that Runnels referred
union clients to Shapero, without disclosing an intent to take money from Shapero in exchange
for the referrals. Thus, the jury may not have found that any payments actually exchanged
hands, but still concluded that Runnels' failure to disclose the scheme was sufficient to sustain
a finding under the intangible rights doctrine.
503. Id. at 1194.
504. Id. at 1192 (citing McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2882 (1987)).
505. Id.
506. Id. (referring to discussion at 1186-88). In Holzer II, 840 F.2d 1343, the court dis-
agreed with the Sixth Circuit on the applicability of the constructive trust theory as a way to
"save cases that had been brought and tried under the now-discredited 'intangible rights' the-
ory." Id. at 1347. Holzer involved a judge who had taken bribes, in contrast to the attorney in
Runnels. The court, however, noted that otherwise, the two cases were not distinguishable, as
"constructive-trust principles apply with equal force to public fiduciaries." Id.
The Holzer II court, however, went on to i ject the constructive trust theory. The court
stated that the bribe money Holzer took could only be deemed the principal's property in "an
attenuated and artificial way," since "the State of Illinois does not sell justice." Id. at 1348.
Additionally, the court stated that:
A constructive trust [would be] imposed on the bribes not because Holzer intercepted
money intended for the state or failed to account for money received on the state's
account but in order to deter bribery by depriving the bribed official of the benefit of
the bribes. Unless we assume unreasonably that the state wants Holzer to take bribes
so that it can recoup them under constructive-trust principles, the state's financial
situation is the same whether he takes bribes or doesn't take bribes.
Id. Consequently, the court concluded that this case "is an intangible-rights case and only an
intangible-rights case." Id. With no way to "save" an intangible rights case in light of Mc-
Nally, Judge Holzer's conviction was vacated. Id. at 1352.
507. See Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1186 n.2 (fiduciary duties of public officials well established).
508. See supra notes 488-89 and accompanying text.
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this theory, it was irrelevant that the insurance proceeds in McNally
would have been paid anyway. It was the bribes that the Runnels court
held were the union's money.50 9 Accordingly, the bribes in McNally
could be said to be the state's money. The Runnels court's attempt to
distinguish the two cases missed the point of the court's own agency the-
ory. Therefore, Runnels can be viewed as an imaginative effort to turn
an employee intangible rights case into an economic deprivation case on
facts similar to McNally.
2. Implicit proof of money or property loss
Other courts have found ingenious ways to circumvent the McNally
money or property requirement.510 United States v. Keane 51 involved a
city Alderman who was convicted under the intangible rights doctrine
for defrauding the city of Chicago and its citizens of their right to honest
government.5 12 Keane had purchased tax-delinquent properties at low
prices, and then, through his position in the city council, engineered the
city's purchase of these properties without revealing his interest.51 3
Many of the properties were improperly zoned, and cost more than twice
what the city would normally pay. At trial, the government introduced
evidence that Keane and his partners netted profits of $167,471.30 from
the sale of the properties to the city.
5 14
Following McNally, Keane petitioned for a writ of error coram
nobis, arguing that his conviction under the intangible rights doctrine
was void.515 He specifically objected to a jury instruction wherein the
jury was told that to convict, it was not required to find that the citizens
of Chicago had been defrauded of any monetary loss.5 16 Thus, Keane
509. Id.
510. See Fagan, 821 F.2d at 1002; United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975)
[Keane I], cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976), petition for writ of error coram nobis denied, 678
F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1987) [Keane II], aff'd, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988).
511. Keane I, 678 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff'd, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988).
512. Keane I, 522 F.2d at 538-39.
513. Id. at 540-41.
514. Id. at 543.
515. Keane II, 678 F. Supp. at 709. The indictment accused Keane "of devising and in-
tending to devise a 'scheme and artifice to defraud' ":
The City of Chicago and its citizens and Thomas E. Keane's fellow Aldermen on the
Council of the City of Chicago of their right to the conscientious, loyal, faithful,
disinterested and unbiased services, decisions, actions and performance of official du-
ties by defendant Thomas E. Keane, in his official capacities as 31st Ward Alderman
and as Chairman of the Committee on Finance of the City Council, free from corrup-
tion, partiality, wilful omission, bias, dishonesty, official misconduct, conflict of inter-
est and fraud.
Id.
516. Id. at 710-11 (citing Trial Transcript at 3420).
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argued that, as in McNally, the jury had not been instructed to find the
requisite money or property loss necessary to convict.
In Keane II, the court preliminarily discussed the agency theory ad-
vanced in Runnels. 17 The court found it unnecessary to reach this issue,
however, stating that in this case, "Keane schemed to deceive the citi-
zenry and to deprive it of what is unquestionably property: money and/
or confidential government information." '18 The evidence at trial had
shown that Keane purchased the properties because he had inside infor-
mation about a pending urban renewal project, and then bought the
properties with the purpose of selling them back to the city.5" 9 Thus, the
court reasoned that Keane misappropriated confidential business infor-
mation which "deprived the citizenry of property, 'intangible' though it
might have been."52 Further, by pressuring the city to purchase over-
priced property, the court reasoned that Keane "deceived the citizenry to
deprive it of money.
'521
The Keane II court acknowledged that the jury instructions were
erroneous, but considered the instructions to be harmless error.5 22 The
court stated that:
[T]he jury's verdict that Keane violated the citizenry's rights to
loyal service necessarily contained an implicit finding that
Keane deprived the citizenry of property.... The court was
careful, both at the outset of the trial and in giving its instruc-
tions, to explain the details of the scheme alleged in the indict-
ment .... Therefore, the jury necessarily found a deprivation of
property suffered by the entity deceived, and this would meet
McNally's conception of fraud, as proscribed by the mail fraud
statute.
523
The court determined that, since the jury had implicitly found Keane
had defrauded citizens of a tangible property right, the elements of mail
fraud under McNally were satisfied.
Finally, the court distinguished McNally by simply noting that, in
McNally, the citizenry of Kentucky had not been deprived of any prop-
517. Id. at 712 (citing United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1987)). The Keane
H court also noted that the agency theory had been rejected in Mandel II. Id. n.5. The Keane
II court may have avoided addressing the agency issue in light of these conflicting opinions.
518. Id. at 712.
519. Id. (citing United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1975)).
520. Id. at 712-13 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987)).
521. Id. at 712.
522. Id. at 714.
523. Id. at 713-14 (emphasis in original).
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erty.524 There is some merit to this distinction. The monies Keane re-
ceived for the sale of the properties were unquestionably paid to him
directly by the government.5 25  In contrast, the payments in McNally
came from the Wombwell Insurance Company, and not from the govern-
ment.5 26 Thus, the prosecution in McNally was not able to prove that the
scheme directly deprived the government, and thereby the citizens of
Kentucky, of any property.
Additionally, Keane II has support for the proposition that "confi-
dential business information" constitutes property within the meaning of
the mail fraud statute. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Car-
penter v. United States. 27 In Carpenter, a writer for the Wall Street
Journal was convicted of misappropriating the paper's prepublication
confidential information regarding the timing and contents of the paper's
"Heard on the Street" column.5 28 The Court stated that "[t]he Journal's
business information that it intended to be kept confidential was its prop-
erty ... .,"529 Further, the Court noted that the fact that information is
"intangible" "does not make it any less 'property' protected by" the mail
fraud statute.530
3. Limitations of the agency theory and implicit finding of loss of
money or property
The Carpenter Court suggested that some cases which might have
been prosecuted under an intangible rights theory might still be viable if
the government can prove that the scheme involved a deprivation of con-
fidential information.-3 1  However, Carpenter arose in a business set-
ting,53 2 where the monetary value of a corporation's information is more
apparent. The information misappropriated in Carpenter belonged to the
Wall Street Journal; it was acquired by an employee who obtained it
524. Id. at 711.
525. Keane I, 522 F.2d at 540-44.
526. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2877.
527. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
528. Id. at 319. The author was also convicted of violating rule lOb-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. On appeal, the Court was evenly divided over the securities convic-
tions. As a result, those convictions were upheld. Id. at 320.
529. Id. at 321-22. Additionally, the Court stated: "'[c]onfidential information acquired or
compiled by a corporation in the course and conduct of its business is a species of property to
which the corporation has the exclusive right and benefit, and which a court of equity will
protect ..... '" Id. at 320 (citing 3 W. Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 857.1, at 260 (rev. ed. 1986) (footnote omitted)).
530. Id.
531. Id. at 321.
532. Id. at 318-19.
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pursuant to his position at the paper.5 3a Additionally, the information
about the contents and timing of the column qualified as property, since
it had tangible value to the newspaper. 3" In contrast, when a public
official fails to disclose a bribe, he has not "taken" any tangible informa-
tion wrongfully obtained by his position. Rather, when an official fails to
disclose a bribe, he has simply refrained from revealing an act of
misconduct.
Failing to disclose an act of misconduct is not the same as giving
away a company's valuable business information, as the information
about the misconduct does not in itself have a tangible value. Therefore,
although Carpenter expanded the reach of the mail fraud statute, its ap-
plication may be limited to the business sector. Although Keane II sug-
gested applying the Carpenter theory to a case involving a public official,
Keane II specifically involved the misappropriation of information.535
Thus, Keane II does support the theory that misappropriation of confi-
dential information may satisfy the McNally property requirement in the
public corruption context. However, the confidential information theory
might be limited to cases in which the government can specifically prove
that an official took tangible information. The theory might not work if
the official only fails to disclose bribes, since, in that case, no information
with monetary value has been appropriated. In that case, the McNally
property requirement would not be satisfied.
The agency theory used in Runnels does suggest an "alternative ra-
tionale" for cases previously prosecuted under the intangible rights doc-
trine.5 36  Even if this theory is upheld by the Supreme Court, its
application will be limited to kickback and bribery schemes where the
agent has taken the principal's money.537 The Runnels court admitted
that "situations can be hypothesized in which a fiduciary who knowingly
breaches his duty by accepting a bribe or kickback arguably does not
533. Id.
534. In describing the tangible value of the contents and timing of the column, the Carpen-
ter Court stated:
News matter, however little susceptible of ownership or dominion in the absolute
sense, is stock in trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, organization, skill,
labor, and money, and to be distributed and sold to those who will pay money for it,
as for any other merchandise.
Id. at 321 (quoting International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918)).
Accordingly, the Court held that "[t]he Journal had a property right in keeping confidential
and making exclusive use, prior to publication, of the schedule and contents of the 'Heard'
column." Id. at 320-21.
535. Keane II, 678 F. Supp. at 712.
536. Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1186-88.
537. If the reasoning of Holzer II is followed, the agency or constructive trust theory may
not even be applied to kickback or bribery schemes. See Holzer II, 840 F.2d at 1348.
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deprive the principal of an economic benefit, as would have been the case
if Runnels had not pocketed the payments.., but.., had spent all of the
payments on furnishings for the union hall. ' ' s38 Additionally, the theory
can have no viability in election fraud schemes when no money is in-
volved. Therefore, although these inventive theories tend to resuscitate
the mail fraud statute, they will not cover all cases involving a depriva-
tion of intangible rights.
VII. PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
McNally v. United States5 39 left the future ability to prosecute public
corruption in doubt. Fraudulent schemes often do not violate any state
law, making federal law the sole remedy."4 Moreover, even if a state
statute did proscribe the fraudulent behavior, states do not have the same
resources to prosecute as the federal government. 4 ' For example, the
federal government is able to coordinate investigations with various
agencies such as the FBI, the IRS and the Postal Inspection Service.
5 42
Additionally, since many public corruption cases involve high ranking
state officials, the state may be unable to carry out an effective
investigation.543
In addition to the inadequacies of state law to deal effectively with
the problem of public corruption, federal law often provides no specific
statute under which to obtain an indictment. 544 This difficulty was ex-
plained by Daniel Hurson, former Assistant United States Attorney for
the District of Maryland:
By the time [the investigation] process reaches the indictment
stage, agents and prosecutors may find themselves with facts
accumulated through the course of their investigation that
amount to some sort of improper or dishonest activity but do
not fit the traditional criteria for a federal offense. For exam-
ple, there may be no evidence of interstate activity to promote
538. Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1188.
539. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
540. See id. at 2882 n.9.
541. See generally Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative Ap-
proach, 20 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 423 (1983). For example, federal prosecutors have nationwide
subpoena power over witnesses and documents. Id. at 433.
542. Id. at 432.
543. See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.) [Mandel I], aff'd in relevant
part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), petition for writ of error
coram nobis granted, United States v. Mandel, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987) [Mandel II]
(governor of Maryland); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974) (governor of Illinois).
544. Hurson, supra note 541, at 433-34.
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gambling, extortion, or bribery such as might invoke the provi-
sions of the Travel Act. Or there may be no extortion, either
through fear or under color of official right, which could trigger
application of the Hobbs Act. Quite often mail fraud is the
only federal criminal charge available to bring against a private
individual or a nonfederal public official involved in corrupt
activity.
5 45
Thus, if the mail fraud statute is no longer available to prosecute public
corruption, there may be no statute-either federal or state-under
which to prosecute corrupt actions by public officials.
As a result, Congressmen have proposed several bills to amend the
mail fraud statute.145 One proposal is drawn in broad language, and sug-
gests amending the definition of fraud to include intangible rights.547
This proposal would have wide ranging effects on both public and private
corruption. Another proposal is more narrowly drawn, and directs its
focus specifically at public corruption.5 48 As of this writing, Congress
has not passed either of these amendments.
A. Proposal of Representative Conyers
Representative John Conyers, Jr. introduced a bill that would
amend the definition of fraud to include:
defrauding another of intangible rights of any kind whatsoever
in any manner or for any purpose whatsoever; or by using ma-
terial private information wrongfully stolen, converted, or mis-
appropriated in breach of any statutory, common law,
contractual, employment, personal, or other fiduciary
relationship. 49
Representative Conyers' amendment to the definition of fraud does not
articulate specific intangible rights that are to be included within the new
statute's scope; every intangible right is included. Additionally, the
amendment would cover all misappropriations of material information in
breach of any fiduciary duty.
This far-reaching proposal derives from Representative Conyers' be-
545. Id.
546. H.R. 3050, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 3089, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987);
Letter from Scott Wallace, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL"),
Legislative Director, to NACDL Members Interested in McNally Legislation (September 10,
1987) (draft of bill by Professor John Coffee, Columbia Law School).
547. H.R. 3089, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
548. H.R. 3050, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
549. H.R. 3089, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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lief that the mail fraud statute never contained any "tangible rights" limi-
tation.550 Additionally, he also believes that the statute must be read
broadly to implement its remedial purpose. 55 1 Representative Conyers'
principal concern is that "[a]buse of trust in an interdependent society-
whether of governmental character or otherwise-is far more threatening
to our most basic and important values. 5s52 He expressed his view most
aptly through the words of President Theodore Roosevelt:
There can be no crime more serious than [public corruption].
Under our form of Government all authority is vested in the
people and by them delegated to those who represent them in
official capacity. There can be no offense heavier than that of
him in whom such a sacred trust has been reposed, who sells it
for his own gain.... He is worse than the thief, for a thief robs
the individual, while the corrupt official plunders an entire city
or State. He is as wicked as the murderer, for the murderer
may only take one life against the law, while the corrupt official
... aim[s] at the assassination of the commonwealth itself.
55 3
The proposal, therefore, is designed to encompass a wide range of cor-
rupt behavior that might threaten the public trust.
Representative Conyers' proposal would cover not only public cor-
ruption, but all private fraudulent activity as well. Specifically, the pro-
posal would make breach of fiduciary duty a federal crime. Suggesting
that a federal fiduciary duty exists is "no minor step. ' 554 Congress has
rejected such a proposition on other occasions, finding that governing
private corporate transactions is a matter best suited to state law. 555
Representative Conyers' proposal, therefore, may be drawn too broadly
to overcome congressional resistance to the expansion of a federal inter-
vention in private business.
Further, by failing to define or limit breach of fiduciary duty, Repre-
sentative Conyers' proposal runs the risk of criminalizing a broad range
of apparently innocent conduct. For example, the proposal refers to a
550. CONG. REc. 3240, 3241 (August 4, 1987).
551. Id. at 3241.
552. Id. at 3242.
553. Id. (quoting IX PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES AND STATE PAPERS 3048 (M. Muller ed.
1917)).
554. See United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 23 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J. concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
555. Judge Winter noted that, although Congress has mandated disclosure through the var-
ious securities laws, Congress has generally declined to enact substantive regulations of corpo-
rate transactions. Id. at 24. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700-02 (1982); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflec-
tions on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
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"personal fiduciary relationship;" the boundaries of this relationship are
arguably limitless. Under such a vague standard, the amendment could
criminalize "all actions which might offend the Government's sense of
personal propriety," 5 6 or fail to conform with a particular court's notion
of "accepted moral standards." '5 57 To achieve some uniformity in courts'
decisions, the amendment must delineate more clearly what standard is
to be used to determine when such a breach has occurred.
When the mail fraud statute was used to prosecute intangible rights,
the statute came under attack as being void for vagueness. 55 8 Although
the Supreme Court did not hold that the statute was unconstitutional on
that ground, the Court expressed concern that the statute was being con-
strued in a "manner that [left] its outer boundaries ambiguous ....
Representative Conyers' ambitious proposal suffers from the same defect.
It fails to give adequate notice of what conduct would fall within the
statute's scope. The amendment therefore, can be attacked on vagueness
grounds.
B. Proposal of Representatives Mfume and Synar
A second bill, introduced by Representatives Mfume and Synar is
more narrowly focused toward public corruption." ° This bill, borrowing
language from intangible rights cases, proposes:
As used in [the mail and wire fraud statutes], the term "de-
fraud" includes the defrauding of the citizens of a body poli-
tic- (1) of their right to the conscientious, loyal, faithful,
disinterested, and unbiased performance of official duties by a
public official thereof; or (2) of their right to have the public
business conducted honestly, impartially, free from bribery,
corruption, bias, dishonesty, deceit, official misconduct, and
fraud.561
This proposal would criminalize official misconduct, without creating a
federal fiduciary duty. Most importantly, it would include that which
McNally abrogated-the right to honest government.
As President Theodore Roosevelt stated, public corruption is an es-
556. United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1252 (8th Cir. 1976).
557. Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967).
558. See United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928
(1980).
559. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
560. H.R. 3050, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
561. Id.
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pecially serious offense.5 62 It destroys the public trust, and threatens the
foundations of democratic government. The proposal suggested by Rep-
resentatives Mfume and Synar is aimed at ensuring that American citi-
zens have a right to honest and impartial government. With this as the
goal, there is no need to sweep all private fiduciary breaches within the
scope of a federal statute. Therefore, the amendment would protect citi-
zens' right to be free of official corruption, without broadly criminalizing
apparently innocent behavior.
C. Author's Comment: Proposals for Legislative Change
The Author believes that the intangible rights doctrine was an effec-
tive mechanism for prosecuting public officials charged with kickback
and bribery schemes, election fraud, and schemes in which officials failed
to provide honest and truthful information pertinent to pending legisla-
tion. 63 On the other hand, however, the doctrine was also used to prose-
cute private fiduciary breaches in general business as well as conflicts of
interest cases.' 64 Arguably, with no limitation on the wording of
"scheme to defraud," some of the latter abuses legitimately fell within a
broad reading of the statute. In retrospect, making a federal crime of a
conflicts of interest case may indeed have carried the scope of the statute
beyond its proper boundaries. Although the Court in Badders v. United
States565 held that Congress may forbid any act under the mail fraud
statute that it regards as contrary to public policy, as long as the mails
are used in furtherance of the scheme, 66 this language should not be
taken literally; it would allow for a limitless reach of federal power. The
federal government should not be able to criminalize anything that of-
fends its sense of propriety, without giving adequate notice of the pro-
scribed behavior. 67
562. See CONG. REC. 3240, 3242 (August 4, 1987) (quoting IX PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES
AND STATE PAPERS 3048 (M. Muller ed. 1917)).
563. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd in relevant part, 602
F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), petition for writ of error coram
nobis granted, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987) (failure to provide truthful information in
passing legislation); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974) (deprivation of honest government); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974) (election fraud).
564. See, e.g., United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
915 (1982) (lawyer convicted under mail fraud statute for conflicts of interest in client repre-
sentation); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973)
(employee breach of fiduciary duty).
565. 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
566. Id. at 393.
567. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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Criminalizing corruption by public officials, however, is neither
vague nor an intrusion by the federal government into private business.
Public officials must be expected to act honestly, impartially, and free
from bias and corruption. Moreover, the federal government should be
the authority to ensure that this goal is met. State government may sim-
ply be unable to effectively combat the problem, particularly when the
corruption pervades the highest ranks of the state.568 The Mfume and
Synar proposal, therefore, clarifies that the mail fraud statute should be
the mechanism for prosecuting abuses of the public trust. 69
The Author additionally suggests, however, that the legislation con-
tain an explicit provision proscribing election fraud. Election fraud may
be conducted by one who is not yet a public official, yet should nonethe-
less be liable under the statute for defrauding citizens of their right to
have their affairs conducted honestly. Broadly read, part (2) of the
Mfume and Synar proposal would proscribe election abuse.57 ° However,
in an effort to specify that such conduct falls within the boundaries of
this provision, the Author suggests the following language be added to
the proposal:
(3) of their right to fair elections free from dilution from the
intentional casting and tabulation of false, fictitious or spurious
ballots.571
With this addendum, the proposal clearly proscribes election fraud by a
person who may not be a public official.
As Justice Stevens said in his McNally dissent, "[i]t is sometimes
difficult to define when there has been a scheme to defraud someone of
their intangible rights. '572 Difficulty in constructing a definition, how-
ever, is no excuse for letting fraudulent conduct go unpunished. Fash-
ioning a workable definition for "scheme to defraud" is a task Congress
must undertake. The Mfume and Synar bill, with the addition suggested
by the Author, would provide Congress with that definition. Moreover,
such a definition would ensure that the public trust is not corrupted by
those responsible for providing citizens with honest government.
568. See supra notes 540-45 and accompanying text.
569. H.R. 3050, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
570. Id.
571. United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1153 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085
(1984).
572. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2890 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In McNally v. United States,573 the Supreme Court held that the
mail fraud statute could no longer be used to protect citizens' rights to
honest and impartial government. 4 Whether this decision was justified
in light of the statute's original purpose and years of precedent is ques-
tionable. Nonetheless, the Court has spoken. In doing so, however, it
gave a broad hint to Congress that if public corruption is to be punished
and citizens' rights protected, it is up to Congress to act.5 75 The Author
of this Note hopes that Congress takes the suggestion and acts
immediately.
5 7 6
In United States v. Mandel,577 on the former governor's petition for
a writ of error coram nobis, the court determined it was constrained to
give McNally retroactive effect and vacate Mandel's conviction.
578
Nonetheless, the court articulated the view that there is an inalienable
right to good government:
[I]t must be remembered that this Court's action on these peti-
tions has nothing to do with petitioners' guilt or innocence, in
any moral sense. The people of Maryland, as a matter of natu-
ral law, have and have always had an inalienable right to good
government. A jury of twelve citizens found beyond a reason-
able doubt that the petitioners had deprived all the citizens of
Maryland of that right. This conduct, however, for reasons
amply set forth above, cannot sustain a judgment that the de-
fendants were guilty of federal crimes. A final answer to the
question of petitioners' guilt or innocence, in any broader sense
than that, must await the judgment of history.
5 7 9
573. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
574. Id. at 2879.
575. Id at 2882 n.9. The Court stated that "[i]t may well be that Congress could criminal-
ize using the mails to further a state officer's efforts to profit from governmental decisions he is
empowered to make... [b]ut... it would take a much clearer indication than the mail fraud
statute evidences to convince us that [such a scheme] is forbidden under federal law. Id.
576. See also Open Forum, "Mail Fraud Mistake," L.A. Daily J., July 1, 1987, at 4, col. 2,
stating:
Public corruption is all too evident in some governments .... Prosecutors need
strong weapons to unearth this abuse of public trust.... [Justice] White... noted
that Congress could, if it wanted, negate the [C]ourt's ruling by voting to broaden the
scope of the mail fraud statute. Defrauding American citizens of honest, clean gov-
ernment is a crime-morally, ethically and in our book, legally. Congress should
now make that point unequivocally clear in the federal criminal code.
Id.
577. 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987).
578. Id. at 875-76.
579. Id. at 878-79.
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If we as citizens have an inalienable right to honest government, we
should not have to wait for the judgment of history to be able to enforce
that right.
Ellen Berkowitz*
* The Author wishes to thank Professor Myrna Greenberg for her editorial comments,
and the law firm of Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Phillips for its technical assistance in the
preparation of this Note.
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